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Introduction
The purpose of tnia tx.esis is to present an exposition
of the treatment accorded American philosophy in the Cam-
bridge Hiator.v of American Literature and to compare Lhis
treatment aith tnat of other leading autnorities. For a
complete list of tne autnorities consultfed, see tne biblio-
graphy. Striking similarities and differences among the
commentaries are noted, with especial reference to the Cam-
bridge History .
The Cambridge History of American Literature is a criti
cal survey of the work of American autnor* from colonial
times until the early part of the twentieth century # All
fields of literature are treated by respective authorities
There are certain cnapt-ers which are devoted exclusively
to philosophy.
The first of these chapters is "Edwards" by Paul Elmer
More. Jonatnan Edv^aras epitomizes the Puritan tneology of
colonial days. He stands as the greatest of the Puritan
mystics in our country. His life and philosophy are dis-
cussed in tne first chapter of this thesis.
Tne otner leadigg philosophical tninkers of the eignt-
eenth century are interpreted in the cnapter "Philosophers
and Divines, Ir 20-1789" by I.Woodbridge Riley, the leading
authority for tne philosophy of this period. An interpre-
tation of nia treatment is given in chapter two of tnis
Ik
tnesis*
The great pniloaophical iioveraent in New England in the
early nineteenth century is discussed in the chapter
"Transcendentallsra" contributed by Harold Clarke G-oddard.
His treatment is very general. Only brief feferences are
made to Emerson's philoiophy. Chapter three of this thesis
is Dased upon G-oddard and supplementary authorities.
The chapter of the Camoridge History Wiich is devoted
especially to Emerson is contributed by Paul Elmer More,
tne autnor of txie chapter on Edwards. Our interpretation
of Emerson, based upon More's treatment and tnat of other
authorities, forms ahapter four of this thesis.
The period from tne middle of the nineteentn century
to tne time of the composition 6f the last volume of the
CLambridge History of American Literature (1919) is given
scnolarly and comprehensive treatment by Morris R.Cohen.
The title of Cohen's chapter is "Later Phllofophy . *' Of
living pnilosophers, Cohen treats nnly those who had written
notable works before 1900. The cnief philosophers dis-
cussed by Cohen are as follows: Fiske, Wright, Harris, Peirce,
Royce, James, Dewey , Baldwin, Santayana, Woodbridge, and the
neo-realist s. In chapter five of this tnesis, we present
an interpretation of Cohen and other commentators in this
field, as indicated in tue bibliography.
1
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Chapter I
The Phiioiophy of Jonatnan Edwards
A* His fiarly I,ty gt iciam.
Jonatnan i^dwardg (1 r 03-17:58) was by Lemperanent a myi-
tic In early life » e«peclally, he experienced a keen Joy
in tne contemplation of nature as a manifestaLion of God,
and he felt an earnest longing to be in harmony witn tne
God of nature. In the Cambridge History , More treats this
mystical tendency with due regard. However, he considers
tnat it is Edwards's own fault that ne is cniefly asso-
ciated with sermons of a terrifying nature. Altnougn Ed-
wards retained the essentials of a mystical spirit until
nis death, his writings, for the greater part, are overshad-
owed witn Calvinistic dogma and stern logic.
1. His Private Reflections .
In 17^3* Ed vards wrote his Private Reflections proDably
as a result of a retrospective perusal of his early medi-
tations wnich ne nad recorded In nis diary prior to his
graduation from Yale in 1(20, More compares these early
diary reflections to Berkeley's Commonplace Book, botn of
r
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wnicxi were kept primarily in preparation for later meta-
pnyaical Lreatises. Tne Private f^-eflect iona "for intensity
of absorption in the idea of Ood and for convincing power
of utterance, can be likened to tne Confessions of Saint
AUigustine. More regrets that this remarkable record
ii "not 10 well known as it would have been if it had not
been printed witn the works of a thorny metaphysician."^
In his early life Edwards felt that the power to damn
human souls was incompatible with the goodness of the deity.
Upon contemplating the absolute sovereignty of G-od "in
choosing v/hom ne would to life and rejecting whom he pleased,"
Edv/ards said, "It used to appear like a norrible doctrine to
me.""^ Yet, as ne grew older, he experienced an increasing
Joy in the absolute power of G-od. "Absolute sovereignty
is what I love to ascribe to G-od. But my first convic-
tion was not so."^ Thus we see his early tenderness nar-
dened by wnat ne considered in true Calvlniatic fashion
to be a renunciatory love of G-od. Wnat his logic, deduced
from Galvinistic a saurnpt ions, could not support, he was
perforce compelled to condemn. I'ne following quotation
illuatratea the ineffability of his early mystical ex-
perience. "And as I was walking there, and looking up on
1 3
More, CH, I, 59. Log. c it
.
2 4
Loc.cit
.
Loc.cit
•
4
the sky and clouds, tnere came into my mind so sweet a
sense of the glorious majesty and grace of G-od, that I
know not, how to express....! seem to see them both in a
sweet conjunct ion; majesty and meekness;an awful sweetness;
a high, a great, and holy gentleness."^ We find little
of this mystical outpouring in Edwards ' s • works . As More
states, "He put little of his personal rapture of holiness
into his published works which were almost exclusively
2
polemical in design." Parrington agrees with More in
point long out iiidwards's increasing joy in G-od's sterner
attributes as he felt led on by the need of defending
Calvinistic dogma against the undermining influences of
3the deists and the Arminians.
2. His dissertation on tne Nature of Virtue .
Edwaras ' s Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue , More
considers, combines his etnics and esthetics. Virtue is
defined as tne "beauty of the qualities and exercises of
the neart." In tne following words, More praises Edwards's
ability for reasoning and for creating a pleasing style,
but deplores the deliberate sublimation of his literary
genius to dogma and to fierce denunciation of sinners:
"One cannot avoid the feeling, when his writings are surveyed
1
^More, CH, I, b9-60. Parrington, CM, 156.
2 4
Loc.cit. More, CH, I, 60.
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as a whole, that in hii service to a particular dogma of
religion Edwards deliberately threw away the opportuAity
of making for himself ... .one of the very great names in
literature.""^ Long likewise deplores the fact that flash-
es of literary power were sternly repressed in the interests
of truth. Lewisohn considers that Edwards's mystical fer-
vor and psychological enligntenment fade beside his dog-
3
raatic and sadistic sermons. Riley characterizes him as
outwardly a relentless logician of Puritanism but inward-
ly a mystic. Despite the fact that the most fruitful years
of Edwaras's activity were devoted to deductive logic and
tneological dogma, his native mystical temperament per-
sisted. Parrington refers to Ed'vards as "the last and
4greatest of the royal line of Puritan mystica." We form
the conclusion that Edwards wa« endowed with a deep appre-
ciation of the beauty of nature and the nearness of G-od,
out that conscience led him almost to stifle tne expression
of this type of experience because of nls adherence to
Calvinistic doctrine.
B. His Preacning of Dogmatic Theology.
We now turn our attention more directly from Edwards's
mysticism to nis preaching. More selects the most notori-
ous of his sermons, "Sinners in r,he Hands of an Angry G-od, "
1 5
More, GH, 1,60. Lewisohn, EA, 17
•
2
Long,AL, 77
•
Parrington, CM, 152.
It t t
t 5
delivered at Enfield, Connecticut, In 17^1* as the epitome
of terrorizing preaching rooted In Calvinlstlc dogma.
Edwarda proclaimed in tnls sermon that it was the mere
pleasure of G-od which kept wicked men out of hell at any
time. More does not analyze his preacnlng,but merely
cnaracterlzes it, deplores it, and comments as follows:
"Sincerity of vision may amount to cruelty, and something
is due to the weakness of human nature. Although Ed-
wards was sincere, he had a pitiful psychological effect
upon some of nis congregation.
McG-lffert protests against the popular conception that
hell-fire sermons were typical of ii^dwards's preaching.
He admits Lhat during periods of intense emotional ex-
citement, he '7a8 led to emphasize such dogma, but he con-
tends that such extreme cases were far from representa-
t Ive
.
C. His Attitude toward the Awakening.
1. Belief in Emotional Conversion. ^
An accoiont of ii-dwards's preacning leads to a con-
sideration of his relation to the evangelical movement
known as the Great Awakening. His apology for tnls move-
ment, wnich started in Northampton, and was doubtless given
1
More, CH, I, 61.
2
Mcaiffert, JE,o4.
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emotional impetus by terrifying denunciations of sinners
and "by vivid descriptions of nell,and whicn was carried on
nere by Whitefield, is found in the two treat ises, Thoughts
on tne x^-evival of ^^elip;ion and Marks of tne True Spirit *
Edwards set forth Lne opinion that nysteria was a uni-
versal accompaniment of convprsion. More regrets the fact
that even suicidal and melancholic mania were interpreted
by Edwards as the workings of the Divine Spirit. "Tne
saddest thing in tne wnole affair is the part played by
Edwards. Other leaders saw the danger from the first or
were soon awakened to lt;but Edwards never. .wavered in
nis Delief tnat the Awakening, though marred by the devil,
was in itself the work of tne Divine Spirit. More com-
pares Edwrds's direct appeal to the emotions at the cost
of Judgment, to tne position of the apologists of the ro-
mantic movement in literature. He considers that Edwards
embraced the Awakening as a means of arousing persons
from a spiritual lethargy. Yet he believes that Edwards
failed to distinguish between a stagnant inertia and a
harmony brought about by a power higher than tne imagina-
tion and the emotions. We see that Edwards does not fol-
low the conerence criterion here. Strange that such an
intellect should yield to emotional intoxicat ionl Although
T~
More,GH, I,b2.
L
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inoat critics witness to Edwards's intellectual pi^oweag,
Lewisohn differs, saying tnat he was "not a man of com-
nanding intellect ... .He was a baffled poet and stylist,
baffled by tne moral pathology of his kind."^ It does
appear that is-dwards glorified as evidences of spiritual
rebirth, what modern psychologists would designate as
pathological symptoms bordering upon insanity. But, of
course, ii'dwards lived and died over a hundred years be-*
fore modern psychology became known. "Thus for all his
emotionalism, he lived under the control of an iron will,
and he could not comprenend how the ofer- stimulation of
terror and Joy in a weaker disposition would work moral
havoc. Nor from his own constant height could he under-
stand now brief and fitful any mood of exaltation must be
among ordinary men in their ordinary condition."
In 1 ^^6, Edwards published the Treatise concerning the
Religious Affections , "a work which may witnout exag-
geration be said to go as far as the human intellect can
go in Lne perilous path of discriminating between the
purely spiritual life and the life of worldly morality. "^
More interprets Edwards as nolding the belief that no per-
son is religious until God plants in his heart by the free
act of grace, a love for Himself.
1 3
Lewisonn,EA, 1/. I1iid.,b4.
2
More, CH, I, 63.
<f
(
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Parrington is more critical LJtian More of Edwarda'g
part in tne Awakening. He considers the movement as
evidence that America was still in the seventeenth cen-
tury, that the upper class was not yet rationalized nor
the middle class commercialized."^ He considers that its
results were revolutionary, that ii-dwards unawares over-
threw the old Presbyterian emphasis on the cnurch visible
2by his empnasis on tne church mystical. he is repulsed,
as is More, Dy tne pathological condition of the converts.
2. His Resignation from the Northampton Church.
This belief of Jaldwards in the necessity of an emotion-
al conversion led to a rift between him and nis congpega-
tion at Northampton. Edwards contended that the sacra-
ment of the Lord's Supper should rightfully oe administered
only to persons who had undergone radical conversion and
experienced the affections of supernatural !)Love. This
underlying difference in fundamental belief between Edwards
and tne congregation was intensified by Edwards's criticism
of tne reading, language, and moral habits of the young
people of the first families of Northampton; whereupon he
was asked to resign. Concerning this matter, More writes,
"Northampton nas tne distinction of naving rejected tne
greatest tneologian and philosopher yet produced in this
1 2~
Parrington,CM, lol. Loc.clt.
(i
country." Long maintain a,"Edwards wa« undoubtedly right."
We conclude that Edwards was right in his nigh evalua-
tion of tne mystical element in religious experience,
but tnat he went too far in expecting every meraoer of
h4s church to experience emotional exaltation.
McG-iffert snows now personal antagonism against Ed-
wards oecause of a family fift served to intensify the
opposition at this crucial time. A party division in
Nortnampton between tne wealthy landholders and the other
townspeople antedated t,ne pastorate of Edwards. The death
of one of tne most influential leaders, Stoddard, an uncle
of Ed?nird8, left hj.m comparatively unsupported. McG-iffert
also cites, as does More, the preacher's crit?icism of the
moral practices of the youth as a contributing factor to
Edwards's dismissal. The profiteering of tne business
men and the malpractices of the employers did not escape
the disapproval of Edwards. In general tne people were
not interested in reading Edwards's defense of his belief
whicn ne carefully wrote and nad printed for them. A few
years later,Josepn Hawley,a leader of tne opposing faction,
.
apologized pubicly for his misconduct.
D. The Metaphysics of ii-dwards.
l.His natural Inclination toward an Idealistic Metaphysics.
Prom very early years, Edwards maintained an interest in
1 2
More,CH,I,b4. Long, AL, 73.
r
-10.
raetaphygici along with hlg rayaticiani. In fact, Parring-
ton suggests that nls metaphysical idealism was under-
taken as an attempt to Justify his mysticism.^ More
does not express any such view. "God-consciousness as
passionate as tnat of Spinoza" molded his inteilectual
and spiritual life, writes Parrington. Doubtless a mys-
tical type would lean toward an idealistic metaphysics.
Especially would one of Edwards's deep appreciation of
nature and keen intellect be led to interpret his God
of contemplative companionship as a spiritual being.
2. His Relation to Berkeley.
So similar is Edwards to Berkeley in many aspects of
his thinking that there is debate among critics regard-
ing the source of Edwards's metapnysics. More refers to
the possible influence of Berkeley upon Edwards as an un-
solved problem, and suggests txie possibilities of his ori-
ginality and also of nis reading of Malebranche and Locke.
Riley discredits tne tneory of any direct influence from
Berkeley, and supports his view with internal evidence
2
which he displays in his American Philosophy The earli-
est evidences of Edwards's mysticism are "Notes on tne Mind,"
which are among his reflections while he was an undergraduate
at Yale. More compares tnese reflect ions, as we hawe noted
above, to Berkeley's Commonplace Book, both being pre-
paratory to tne compogition of metaphysical treatises. In
i T
Parrington, CM, 1!:j2. Riley, aP, 129, ff.
r
s
c
< I
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"Notee on tne Mind" the significant basic thought reads,
"Our perceptions or ideas tnat we passively receive by
our bodies are coiamunicated to us immediately by G-od."*^
More does not attempt to solve the problem of tneir re-
lationship, but he gives Edwards credit for carrying on
Locklan philosophy from tne point wnere Berkeleian ideal-
ism left off. Parrington designates Edwards's early in-
terpretation of metaphysics as distinctly Berkeleian,
but he does not undertake to settle Ishe doub^ regarding
the source of tihis interpretation.^ McGiffert states
more decidedly, "Edwards could not nave been acquainted
with Berkeley's writings when he formulated his own
philosophy." Only a few major types of philosophy are
possible to the nuraan mind,McGiffert asserts, and there-
fore it is quite possible that Edwards's was spontaneous.
It seems to us perfectly probable tnat two such similar
minds on opposite sides of tne Atlantic Ocean mignt nave
arrived independently at their conclusions.
3» The Freedom of the Will .
Edwards's metaphysics, as developed later^ concerned
chiefly the nature and power of G-od and tne problem of
evil. The Freedom of the Will , written by Edwards during
his six-year residence at Stockbridge, contains his logi-
cal deductions concerning tnese problems. More considers
i 3
Quoted by More,CH, I,57« McGiffert,ffE, 22.
2
Parrington, CM, lt)3«
fI
r
o
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tnat "the Edwardian theology waa a part of the great
deistic debate wnlcxi took its root 'in the everlasting
question of the origin of evil in the world. "-^ Both
Calvinists and infidels were deterministic, but the dif-
ference lay in the conception of the nature of the de-
termining cause* The Calvinists upheld the view of a
personal Creator, omnipotent and omniscient ; whereas the
deists conceived of the universe as a perfectly function-
ing macnine with no room for either a personal governor
or real sin. The Arminians, who composed a large pro-
portion of cnurchmen at tnis time, believed in the free-
dom of the will. Their champion, i^aniel Whit oy, refuted
Calvinism in his treatise, On tne Five Points of Cal-
vinism, published in England in 1710, and reprinted in
America. It was not a difficult task for a logician
of Edwards's caliore to riddle tne arguments of the
Arminians. It was for this purpose that he wrote his
famous work The Fx eedom of tne Will .
The basis of the argument in this book is psycho-
logical, viz. , an identifying of the functions of human
desire and will. He opposes Locke's differentiation of
these. The Arminians accept Locke's theory, and so make
man's cnoice of evil deliberate, unswayed by inclina-
tion, ^dwards maintains that a person's will at any
moment is his strongest motive or inclination at that
1
More, CH, I, 65.
t
-13-
moment. It is "free in so far a« no obstacle is pre-
sented to our willing in accordance with our inclina-
tion, but our inclination is determined by wnat at any
moment seems to us good."^ God is responsible for the
inclinations whicn determine tne numan will. Prom tnis
point Edwards advances beyond Qalvin. ¥ue latter warned
against any intrusion into the metapnysics of God, but
Edwards applies the psychology of man to tne psycho-
logy^ of ^od. He accepts tne logical conclusion of Berke-
ley's theory, viz., tnat God is induced by external power.
"The fatal mystery of good and evil, the true cause, lies
above and oeyond nim;he is like ourselves, a channel, not
tne source. Tne only difference is that God has complete
knowledge of tne possioilit ies of Deing, and therefore is
not moved by tnreats and olank commands, but, immediately,
by what Edwards elsewhere calls the 'moral necessity* of
governing in accord with the best of the 'different objects
of choice tnat are proposed to the Divine Understanding.'"^
More continues by comparing tnis tneory to tnat of Leib-
nitz, in wnicn God selects for creation that system "wxiich
combines tne greatest possiole amount of good wit a the
least possible admixture of evil."-^ However, as More points
out,i£dwards omits from nis philosophy one of tne Leib-
nitzian inferences, viz. , that of optimism and tne negli-
glDle proportion of evil. in reality. "On the contrary, tne
i 2 3
More,CH,I,bb-6r
.
Ibid., 69. Loc.cit.
(}
0!
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wnole animua of nis teaching springs from a deep and
Immediate hatred of evil In itself and apart from any
consideration of its cause. ""^ Tnls argument that tne
Intrinsic diavalue in evil Is worthy of condemnation
aside from tne origin, sufficed as a practical reply
to tne Arminian contention tnat Lue doctrine of predei-
tlnati^n eliminated tne punishment of sin.
4. More*B Criticism of Sdwards's Hatred of Svil*
More criticizes this Edwardian natred of evil as
disastrous to nis tneology. He asks, "In what essen-
tial way , then, does tne act of G-od in creating a world
mixed with evil differ from the a«t of Judas in oe-
t raying G-od?" He also aeems it a logical conclusion
to ulame G-od for the evils of warfare and accordingly
to iiate nlm for tals evil content. But More prefers
not thus to explore into ultimate reality. He asserts
that v^e can follow Edwards's metaphysics to the break-
ing point Just as v/e aan do with any metaphyslc*. Ob-
viously More would advocate an avoldanca of the mental
task of thinking through the problem of evil; for he ex-
claims, "Aye, but the difference to us morally If we leave
that cause in Its own vast obscurity, unapproached by our
reason, untouched by our pride; or If we make it Into an
image of ourselves, compo«led only of understanding and
i 2
More, CH, I, 69. Loc.cit.
(
dis-
inclination like our own, and subject to our reprobation
as surely as to our lovel""^
More gives Edwards credit for having forever destroyed
the arguments of tne Arminians for free will. He then
asks if there is no escape from the apparent dilemna of
2theological determinism and fatalistic atheism. He re-
minds us Lhat James Boswell freed his mind by forgetting
the problem, and that Dr. Samuel Johnson merely stated,
"All theory is against tne freedom of the will, and all
experience for it."-^ Sucn a statement reveals tne rift
ofttimes existing between the empirical data and formal
theory. Our autnor suggests the theory of Isaac Watts
as one which, though not silencing metaphysical difficul-
ties, gives them an ethical turn. His is the advocacy of
the suspension of volition until one is capable of Judg-
ing properly. But, as More state s,adwards dismisses this
view by identifying suspension itself with volition.
More concludes this discussion by suggesting a way out of
the dilemma into a 'lorally satisfying dualism witnin the
person's soul. He prefers tne looseness of the Arminian
doctrine to the rigid logic of Edwards's predestination,
because tne former"leaves an easier loophole of escape
into a huraan pnilosophy.
1
More, CH, I, 69. Loc.cit
•
2 4
Ibid., 70-71. Loc .cit
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E. General Appraisal of the Work of Edwards
#
More ' s following words appear in a general appraisal
of the life and work of Edwards j "He remains one of the
giants of the intellect and one of the enduring masters
of religious emotion. He nad not the legal and execu-
tive brain of Calvin. .but in subtle resourcefulness of
reasoning and still more in the scope of his spiritual
psychology he stands above nis predecessol?. Few men
have studied Edwards witnout recognizing the force and
nonesty of his genius."
Lewisonn is not so hearty in nis praise, nor would we
expect him to be, with his inclination toward unrestrained
expression of personality. He refers to Edwards as "a
sick soul but a scholar and a man of high spiritual dig-
2
nlty»" He deplores the fact that his "tight and tense"
3logic was invalidated by absurd assumptions.
Long's opinion is much loftier than that of Lewlsohn
and more nearly in accord with that of More. "In all her
history America nas never produced a man more governed by
the spirit of truth." Long also credits Edwards with
pioneer service in the psychology of religious experience.
As we have noted above, Edwards ' s interpretation of theie
data was very different from the modern one.^ fi-dwards's
1 4
More, OH, I, 70. Long,AL, 71.
2
Lewisohn,EA, 2. Ibid., 73-
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plan and scope of tnougnt for nia contemplated Hlatory
of the V/ork of Redemption reminds Long of i-'ante or Mil-
ton. In regard to The freedom of the Will , Long says that
although we reject his system instinctiyely, this book
was "a work which for solid reasoning power has hardly
a peer in the English language."-^ He refers to it as
the "first American book to influence profoundly the
thought of the whole world." Long deals in stronger
terms of praise than More.
Parrington considers that Edwards was a forerunner of
Emerson in hii metaphysical idealism, but reactionary in
his adherence to Calvinism. More, also, refers to Edwards
as an earlier and pernapi greater Emerion. Cohen rates
Edwards higher than Emerson in tne field of philosophy.
Riley calls Edwards "chief of New England divines" and
the "chief native exponent of the scholastic of the heart,
the dialectic of tne feelings- "-^
Royce discusses Edwards as the first representative
American philosopher. By interpreting his own religious
experiences, he rediscovered for the world some of the pro-
foundest ideas of G-od and humanity. He viewed religion
synoptically and reconciled tragic conflicts of the
4
spiritual realm.
- _
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Ghapter II.
Philosophers and Divines (1720-1789)
A. G-eneral Movements Which Undermined Calvinism.
Riley's treatment of the philosophy of the eighteenth cen-
1
tury in America'is the most extensive and authoritative we have.
His large volume, American Philosophy , discusses this period in
detail, and his American Thoup;ht summarizes this discussion.
Riley classifies the movements which undermined Calvinism
according to the traditional classification of the mental func-
tions, viz., the intellectual, the volitional, and the emotional.
The intellectual revolt took the form of deism or rationalism,
the spread of which from Europe to this coimtry was interrupted
by the emotional upheaval led by Jonathan Edwards when "Edwacds
2
the logician became, in a measure, Edwards the enthusiast." The
volitional element, carried on by ethical reformers, had been her-
alded bjf the Arminians and answered by Edwards's The Freedom of
the Will (175^). As discussed in the previous chapter, the chief
issue was that of morality versus the theory of divine grace.
The emotional element of the revolt was embodied in the White-
field controversy- Although acclaimed as an ally to Calvinism,
Whitefield proved to be an underminer by entering the opening
made by the Calvinists in their emphasis upon man's passivity.
V/hitefield led persons to allow themselves in their passiveness
to be carried away by feeling. Riley denlores this lack of
3
balance. Parrington, in his discussion of Edwards as an enthu-
siast, points out how he, just as Whit edffield, undermined the very
1 2 3
Riley died in 1933. ^^ley* CH, 1, 72. Ibid. , 72-73.
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system wnich he sought to uphold. The Whitefield movement
v^as condemned by the clergy and the colleges as unworthy of
the age of reason^ and it received particularly deprecatory
treatment by the pen of Wigglesworth, and more thoughtful op-
position by Charles Chauncy and Jonathan May hew, whom we shall
discuss below.
Riley considers that , in the main, the evangelical movement
soothed the Nbw England "nervous systfeia" hj replacing the dread
judicial Deity by a benevolent G-od, whose goodness was inconsis-
tent with irresistible power'and its correlary of irresistible
grace. The enthusiasts substituted hope for the old doctrine
of eternal damnation resulting from total depravity.
B. Charles Chauncy 's Benevolence of the i^eity.
Chauncy 's arguments for tne benevolence of God have an em-
pirical basis. To :ils v/ay of thinking,the objects of creation
reveal too much skill to have been destined merely for ultimate
destruction. Such a purpose we pecognize as unreasonable. The
capacities for happiness v/itnin the creatures seem to Chauncy
to indicate a less "jaundiced view of the Creator."
In /-is discussion of tne problem of evil, Chauncy holds thkt
evils do not necessarily constitute a defect in the benevolence
of the Deity, because we cannot judge of the complete design.
V/liat seems evil to a partial view may be a part of a total good
Riley attacks Lhe futility of this view as "naught but the old
arguiaent of a learned ignorance, much used by the upholders of
2
the scheme of inscrutable decrees." Such a view is an appeil
Parrington, CM, 101-162. Riley, CH, I, y7.
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to faith rather than to a coherent system of metaphysics.
Riley considers that the strength of Chauncy lies in his
attack upon absolute causation rather than in his treatment
1
of the problem of evil. Chauncy escapes the net of determin-
ism mtt) which Edwards is drawn, by an appeal to common sense,
viz., that determiiism is satisfactory for the beasts of the
field, but that , applied to humanity, it would destroy all pos-
sibility for morality. Although this conclusion seems to us
val£d,the form of argument is a rat ionalization|of the desire
to upxiold tne possibility of character development. The same
criticism may oe applied to Chauncy ' s argument ai_^ainst divine
intervention. He proposes the belief tnat a greater good can
be accomplished by conformity to Ipv/.
Riley places Chauncy 's chief contribution in his undermin-
ing of the harsh Calvinistic doctrines, and the substitution
for an enthusiastic sent imentalism, af a placid contentment with
the lav/s of G-od.
C. The Divine goodness of Jonathan Mayhew (1720-1766).
Mayhew is treated briefly by Riley as a "master of ironic
attack" but not as a lofty thinker. His radicalism is revealed
in his rejection of the trinitarian doctrine almost two gener-
ations before the Unitarian Manifesto of 1819« His chief em-
phasis is rpon the necessity for wisdom in ^od. A fJod ^ho is
good but iiOt -'ise may commit evil deeds. He claimed that ^od
would not in an arbitrary and v/holesale manner damn human souls
1
Riley, CH, I, 77.

but that he night reasonable resort to punitive Justice,
even as an earthlir sovereign v^ould do. Riley considers May-
hew' s defense -"eak "but interest in;- as a typical, hollov; docu-
ment •
D. The Philosophy of Samuel Johnson (1696-1772).
In the field of American Philosophy , Samuel Jolinson stands
as the nost important figure betv/een Edv/ards and Enerson,and,
as Riley observes, "one of the most attractive of colonial think-
ers."^
1. His fiarly Radicalism.
In his early years, Johnson gave evidence of radicalism in
espousing the cause of tne Church of England, and in studying
Bacon's Advancement of Legrning , v/hich helped to lead him from
Puritan darkness into the light. As a result of this new light,
he issued t.ie manuscript
,
The Travails of t he Inte llect in the
Microcosm and the Macrocosm * In .lis next publication, A G-eneritl
Idea of Philosophy, he abandoned the metaphy>3ics taught at Yale,
and defined philosophy as "the study of $ruth and Wisdom, i.e.,
2
of tr.e Objects and ^'^ules conducing to true Happiness." This
thought received fuller expression in the Introduction to the
Study of Philoso'hy (173l)> in which thw Puritan conception of
trie glory of ^od as man's chief aim, was replaced by the view
of tne happiness of man as tne chief end of G-od. It seems to
us more reasonable to interpret the end in terms of value rather
than of happiness, but this hedonistic emphasis can be explained
_ 2
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as a swinging from tne sadism of tne Salvinist to the opposite
extreme*
3- His Opposition to the Doctrine of Beterminism.
After returning from a trip to ii^ngland v;here Johnson receiH-ed
ordination in tne Church of England, he dire_cted tongue and pen
against absolute predestination, by pointing out the inconsisten-
cy betv/een such doctrine and morality. A similar discussion was
initiated, as we haire noted above, by Charles Ghauncy. The Pres-
byterian do-:ma of Jonathan Dickinson was accorded specific re-
futation by Joiinson's claims that predestination imputed hypocrisy
to G-od. Hiley quotes Joiinson's illustration of this point.
The G-od of Calvinism is compared to an unreasonable eai'thly ru-
ler who is intent upon taking the life of a suDject,but who Of-
fers to the condemned person, as a means of escaping death by
hanging, the feat of accom:)lishing an impossibls task. Riley
evaluates Johnson's constructive argument more highly than his
controversial elements.
3. A Close Disciple of Berkeley.
"The correspondence between Johnson and 3erkeley was the most
notable in the history of early American thought." Johnson
was first attracted by Berkeley's argument against necessity.
D^aring rrierkeley '.3 visit to Rhode Island, Johnson developed a keen
admiration both, for the man and for iiis s^'sten of thought. The
denial of tne absolute existence of matter meant for Johnson the
i
Riley, CH, I, 84.
i4
"denial of an inconceivable subsuratuis of sensible phenome-
na. The merely relative existence of sensible things
meant to him the orderly combination of sensible phenome-
na, whereby the Divine ideas, archetypes of physical existence,
caused sensations of pleasure and pain. The accep-tance of
Eerkeleianism led to Johnson* s own interpretation in Elementa
Philosophica , a remarkable preaentation of idealism, which was
seemingly impossible to most Americans of his day. Riley
commends its balance between fatalism and enthusiasm.
Riley regrets the opposition and indifference accorded
Johnson's idealism in this country. The comirionsense realism
found Berkeleianism beyond comprehension. The times were
out of joint for the reception of iramat erialism. Johnson's
belief in the enlightenment of ail persons of all races was
opposed. It was also difficult for the Puritan conception
that infants were born in sin, to give ^vay to Johnson's ad-
vocacy of the maxim, "Pueris maxima reverentia debetur.
"
This view of Johnson is in agreement with modern psychology.
Johnson's belief in the phenomenal character of matter vjas
interpreted by William Smith, the provost of the College of
Philadelphia, as equivalent to the rem.oval of the grounds of
moral obligation. It was an ironical fate, as Riley observes,
that "though he had written the best ethicaJ. treatise of
colonial times, he '-7as nevertheless charged with being fan-
tastical, and his work with underr.'.ining morality.""^ Of such
1 3
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snortalghtednes* is public opinioni
E. John Woolman,a Myitic (1720-1^72)..
"In Woolaan. . . .we have the friiiita of quietism as con-
trasted with the fruits of controversy • Riley discusses
tne mjasticism of this Quaker tailor very briefly, but with
sincere appreciation. He points out Woolman*s emphasis,
contrary to the Calvinistic doctrine of depravity, on the
possibilities for good in the human heart. Woolman stresses
duty rather than doctrine, and opposes the social evils of
war, lottery, slavery, the sale of rum, and cruelty to animals.
He was actuated by Lhe inward mystical principle which
moves man to love the invisible God and all of his visible
manifestations. His mysticism reminds one of Emerson in
its nigh evaluation of each individual. The chief source
for a study of Woolman 's mysticism is nis Journal .
Woolman 's belief in tne brothernood of man led to his
publication of the treatise Some Considerations on the
Keeping of Negroes (175^-1762). He maintained that liber-
ty was tne right of all, and that- negro slaves were deserv-
ing of tneir snare in tne profits derived from their la-
bors.
Riley calls Woolman "a logician of the neart" and a
Vfcers Plowman." Long upholds this sintiment by the words,
"a friend who makes us know and trust the saints of all
ages. "^
1
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Cnapter III
Transcendentalism
Goddard treats the nany aspects of transcendentalism:
theological, literary, social, and philosophical* It is the
last-nanffid manifestation which v/e snail discuss here. Philo-
sophically transcendentalism was a defense of man's practi-
cal and imaginative faculties against encroaching rational-
ism and skepticism.
A« Geraanic Influence.
'German influence v/as Drought directly from Goettingen in
1819 by George Ticknor, (ieorge Bancroft, and Edward Everett;
but tne influence of Schelling, indirectly tnrougj:i Coleridge,
was even greater. Parrington interprets the relation to Ger-
man philosophy as follows: Transcendentalism"went to Germany
to find confirmation of its faith, not to re-examine Its foun-
aat ions
.
3. Emerson's Contribution.
Of the members of the Transcendentalist CluD formed in lb56,
Emerson ..-as tne only real philosopher. His nature is called
by fjoddard "tne piiilosophical const'A.tilLt ion of transcendentalism"
nis adr.ress Sae ftmerican Scr-olar , the apyjlication of the same
theory to .ne realm of letters; and tne Div inity Scnool Address
,
2
its ap'jiicat ion to t neology, ijodcard does not treat tnis
1
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phllosophy in detail, as there is a separate chapter on Eraer-
son by More.
G. The Origin of Lhe 'i'erin.
Although G-oddard does not consider it his purpose to give
a coiaplete exposition of the philosophy of transcendentalism,
he does treat the origin o-^ the term. He explains how it ap-
peared in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and :'-s3uraed a new
shade of meaning in the Critique of Practical Reason . The
meaning used by Kant , viz ., the reference to zYie way the mind
"constitutes" its world of sense, was generalized by the New
England thinkers and apolied to whatever transcends the exper-
iences of sense or is independent of them, i.e., including the
innate, original, universal, a priori , and intuitive.
D. She Iletaphysics of Transcendentalism.
The transcendent alist s ODpos' d the Lochian theory, which
they considered as a denial of innate idr-as or as"sen3at ion-
alismV They insisted upon the soul's inherent power to grasp
truth. This theory led to a metaphysics similar in structure
to the Pla onic and otner idealistic theories of the past.
Although, as doddard points out, their chief interest did not
lie in building a system, but ratner in cultivating an attitude
and pervading spirit, he mentions the following principles:
the Over-Soul which unifies all being and gives life to all,
the microcosm containing within itself the lav;s of the 7/hole,
and the adoption as the purpose of life, the realization of the

potentialities of one's being directl^^ through nystical
rapture and mediately through the goodness, truth, and beauty
revealed by nature. Tne derived teachings are as follovrs:
self-reliance and individualism, the identity of maral and
physical lav/s,the essential unity of all religions, the nega-
tive nature of evil, the spirit of complete tolerance and ab-
solute optinism, and the defiance of tradition and all exter*»
nal authority. However, it is not in metaphysics, but in the
"spirit of uplift" and "noral impulsion" that 'joddard finds
the neart of New Sngland transcendentalism. Kogers refers
to t\:ls spirit as "stimulation without precision." As Par-
rington observes, transcendentalism "v/as a faith rather than
a philosophy'" ; it was oracular rather than speculat ive, aff irma-
3tive rather than questioning."
E. Oriental Blements in New England Transcendentalism.
The affinity of these Concord thinkers for miJ-sticism ra-
ther than for me-aphysics is revealed by "heir preference for
the oriental "Scriptures." (loddard says very little on this
point. Christy * s. The Orient in American Transcendentalism
discusses the ude made by Emerson, Thoreau, and Alcott of Hindu,
Sg:,^pt ian, and Persian v/rit ings, and in turn the Hindu acknow-
ledgient of Eme son and -^horeau as true ny sties. The influ-
ence of Thoreau on tjhandi through his "civil disobedience" is
interesting. G-odclard cites the similarities of New England
transcendentalism and oriental meditation as suggestive of
1
4
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evldence of weakness in the former. He refers to the follow-
ing elements: the tendency to neglect proximate for ultimate
causes, the neglect of the material in the search for the spir-
itual, the substitution of passivity for alertness and creative
force, the traces of a paralizing pantheism and fatalism, and
the atrophy of will. Lewisohn observes in this connection,
"And so the New England Transcendentalist s projected a world
in Which everything was intellectually dared but in which prac-
tically (except in the matter of ant i- slavery ) nothing was
done."^ However, G-oddard cites the following qualities of the
New England movement which offset the ineffectiveness of the
orientalism: "a dash of Yankee practicality, ... .sturdy Puritan
pugnacity, ... .and a grasp of facts underneath its serenest of
o
Olympian detachments.' Christy summarizes the essential
similarities and differences between tne Concord School and
the Oriental mind in the following words: "The pervading con-
sciousness of the Infinite was a supreme reality to them, but
they also recognized the reality of the individual soul."^
F. The Attitude of the Transcendentalist s toward the Abolition
Movement.
The principle underlying the interest of the transcenden-
talist s in the abolition movement was the emphasis on the
divinity of every human soul. Even Emerson, we note, though
averse personally to active participation in reform, was dis-
turbed keenly by the Fugitive Slave Law.
i 2 5
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(j. Amos Bronson Alcott,]iIystic and Teacher.
Of the leaders discussed by G-oddard,the only one save
Emerson, vnio is connected v/ith our discussibU is Amos Bron-
son Alcott. He is noted for applying the Platonic concep-
tion of education. He is mystical and oriental in spirit.
G-oddard leaves trie question unanswered as to v/hether Alcott
was an "active and elevated but withal ordinary nind" or
whether there was a "touch of real genius in him.""^ Tn
Rogers's discussion of him, he states that the conversational
ability is "the issue to which transcendentalism seeas natur
,.2
ally to gravitate. Cnristy considers that no fair ap-
praisal of Alcott has been made, "because so little of his
personality ever found its way into the printed page."
Christy treats him as a propagandist of orientalism. We
are led to believe tiiat he \ias an enthusiastic and sincere
person, but rather undisciplined intellectually.
H. Misunderstanding of tiie Movement.
G-oddard points out now transcendentalism was misunder-
stood because of excesses among the init iated, some of *ihom
interpreted transcendental to iiiean "transcending cominon
sense, "and also because of the confusion by those on the out
side of this movement, of transcendentalism with other cur-
4
rents of social and religious unrest. Long agrees on this
point and he goes beyond G-oddard in criticizing the raovej^ent
1 3
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for a neglect of the past and for fanaticism.
1
I. Tne Foundation of Transcendentalism on Puritan Character.
G-oddard evaluates nlghly tne decisive actions of Emerson,
Thoreau, and Alcott, in re.xai d to church, state, and school, re-
spectively. "The Puritan character vras the rock on which
,.2
transcendentalism was iDuilt . Despite their differences,
G-oddard believes tnat ii.dv/ards, Emerson, and William James dis-
play "a something central and controlling, a certain com-
3
munity of spirit. Koyce also regards these three as the
American classic philosophers because they were original and
creative thinkers and because they interpreted their ages.
1 3
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Chapter IV
The Philosophy of Emerson
A. His Outstanding Position.
More opens tne chapter on Emerson with the statement: **It
becomes more and more apparent tn^t bmerson, Judged by an in-
ternational or even by a oroad national standard, is tiae out-
standing figure of American letters."-^ More considers that
ne owes this distinction to hi« personal genius and to nis
embodiment of the "transient experiment" of New England tran-
scendentalism. Likewise Gay writes : "Emerson presented a uni-
verse seen through a temperament^ . • • . one of the most friendly,
courageous, and serene the world has known."
B. Nature .
In Nature (I836), Emerson presents the view that tne phen.-
omenal world is a DeautifuD symbol of the inner spiritual
life, and that discipline is taught by nature to tne attentive
soul. G-oddard calls tnis work "the philosophical constitu-
tion of transcendentalism."^ In regard to this tneory,G-ay
says, "He was unanaken in .as belief tnat noumenon is the only
reality but, as he said, he had no grudge against matter or phen-
omenon, because he found it fascinating. Besides, was not pnen-
omenon still tne symboX of tne divine?"^ G-ay goes further tkan
Gaddard in analyzing tnis theory >that nature and man must not
be divorced but must oe considered in harmony and unity.
Firkins adds tnat Emerson was an idealist, not in the sense
of disbeliening actuality of matter, but in the sense of
1
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Deliening txiat sense-irapreasiona depended on character and
intelligence ."^
C» His Eflsays *
Of nis Bs say
s
( lo4l- lo4A ), More says that they were the
forma "into which was distilled the very quintessence of the
2
volatile and heady liquid known as Eiaersonianism. " More
mentions tne subjects : self-reliance, compensation, and the
Over-Soul; but he does not give any detailed exposition, such
4
as we find in Qay^ and Firkins.
D« The American Scnolar *
The AmeJ?ican Scnolar,the Phi Beta Kappa Address at Harvard
in 1637, More considers as "a high but scarcely practical ap-
peal" to tne scnolar to raise himself above pedantry, out of
routine, and to reach after the inspiration fif tne Divine Soul*
Judging from Cohen's observation coneerning the dust of
pedantry wnicn covered tne academic woric of this period, this
exhortation provided good ualance.-^ Riley considers that tke
warmth of inspiration was sadly needed oy txie cold New Eng-
land reasoning.^
E. Tne Divinity School Address *
In the Divinity School Address (1638), Emerson condemned
tue emphasis of historical Christianity upon tne person of
Jesus. He believed tnat all persons could experience an in-
tuition like tnat of Christ, but not througn instructvon
"1 3 5
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rltual. This replacing oy Emerson of tne person of Jesus
by a "Onorus of thoughts and hopes" aroused much opposition.^
However^ Emerson was indisposed to engage in argumentation to
support his views. His thoughts were given to him immediate-
ly by the Spirit of which he was a part.
Some critics have considered that Emerson was incapaole of
argumentation. FlrKins, however, sajis that he was not incapal)le
of formal logical processes, but that ne considered tnen del|iy-
ing and coring. He cites many examples of his use of argu-
ment in the writings of nis early yeari.^ In regard hl»
dislike of matnematics and logic, FlrKlns writes: "The reason
is not overtasked, but the imagination and tne sensiDilit ies
are underfed. .. .He was not Deaten;he was starved."^
In discussing Emerson's attitude toward religion, Firkins
says, "The peculiarity of Emerson might be defined in these
terms: he brought into the service of the religious instinct
a larger amount and greater variety of material than was evBr
4.
applied to that function by any other of the sons of men.
P. His Resignation from His Church.
One of the turning points in Emerson's career was his resig-
nation from nis church in Boston^ More ireminds us that it
was nearly a century earl^et-tnat "the greatest of American
theologians" was forced to resign in regard to the same issae,
viz., the Eucnariat. Riley says of this Incident, "In the words
of an English critic, he left his church with a yawn."-^ |fe
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note that Eraeraon left volant arjlyt
Influences, Ancestral and Foreign*
Concerning the influences, ancestral and foreign, upon
Emerson, More says that "with all the divinity of Massachu-
setts in his veins," he could not get away from the Puritan
emphasis upon religion and character. Parrington shows how
tnis divinity formed a great part of Eaerson's childhood
character, but how he gradually freed himself from its barren-
ness and re strict ions ."^ We add here a reference to the em-
phasis which Brooks places upon Lhe influence of Mary Moody
Emerwon, aunt of the philosopher, who encouraged him from his
2
earliest years.
The foreign influences were chiefly Greek, oriental, and
seventeenth-century English. Kant, Schelling, and Fichte be-
came known to Emerson in his later years after his theories
had already been molded. More agrees here with Riley, who ex-
plains that Emerson* s knowledge of G-erman metaphysics was
"slight and secondary."^ More points out that the evidence
of his Journal shows that the main issues of his doctrine
were relatively independent of external influences.
H. Emerson's Style.
More speaks briefly of the spontaneity of Emerson's style,
eipecially as revealed in the exceptional quality of hie ethi-
cal epigrams in quatrain form. Here he shows the fine art iJf
combining gravity of thought with simplicity of expression.
1 3
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!• Exceaalve Optimism.
More' 8 cnief criticism of Emerson is his excessive op-
timism wnich apparently ignores the problem of evil. He
quotes Charles Eliot Norton's opinion that in his declining
years iJifflerson became dogmatic in holding to his optimism and
unawareness of evil. Carlyle believed that Emerson failed t#
see the "hand of the devil in human life." Lewisohn says,
"Angry dualists, like Mr.Paul Elmer More, have blamed Emerson
for neglecting so wholly the evil that is under the sun."^
He admits that it is a defect to neglect human suffering, but
a blessing to omit evils in the Puritanic sense of sin, morals,
laws, prisons, etc. Lewisohn is glad to see one American of
tnose early days who does not overemphasize the sense of sin*
"But that he drops sin from his vision of tnings is all but
his highest claim as a prophet and a teacher of his time and
folk. "2
Parrington, however, emphasizes the selections from Emerson's
Journal which do bear upon evil. He shows that such passages
reveal no "jaunty optimism. "5
Riley points out how Emerson courageously triumphed over
adversities of ill health, family losses, and poverty, and how
despite them, he upheld a radiant optimism. This opinion is
borne out by Firkins 's belief that Emerson forestalled pain
by concentrating on stronger interests.-' Furthermore, Firkins
claims that his depreciation of wrong and guilt is intelligi-
ble in the light o^ his faith in an all-powerful benevolence
1 3 b
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and his reliance on ths instincts of the individual. "Emer-
son's sense of social evil was keen and multifarious; its mul-
tifariousness decreased its intensity. ... For Emerson the to-
tality of the evil demonstrated and derided the partiality of
the reform.
More thinks that Emerson's probable recognition of the exis-
tence of evil was unaccompanied by a seriousness regarding its
consequences for philosophical thought. His appeal is chieflyy
to the youthful rr.ind, for, as More says, the maturer judgment
turns to sages who have grftprled with the evils of existence.
Christy claims that Eme.son does not deny the existence of sin
and failings, but says that they do not touch the Absolute.^
More characterizes Emerson's emphasis upon hove reaching enen
to the assurance of present happiness, a» unique in American
thought.
Long's main criticism of Em.erson, viz. , his inconsistency in
ignoring the past, is not discussed by Mcre.'^ But Riley says
that Emerson was not unmindful of his debt to the pa»t.^ Brooks
bears out Riley's view: "None was more passive than he before
Shakespeare, Goethe, Plator he became a mere organ of hearing be-
fore them and yielded himself to the laws of these mighty be-
ings, "°
More discusses Emerson's dualism in regard to his synthesis
of the many and the one, and in regard to the transiency and yet
the unalterable nature of reality. Gay also mentions this prob-
lem: "He has reached the eternal paradox of the one and the many
and he makes no attempt to solve it."'''
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Chapter V
Later Philosophy
A. Dearth of Speculative Thought in America until the Post-
Darwinian Unrest.
1. The Chief Tradition of Anerican I'hilosophy, English and
Scottish.
Conen nakes clear his opinion that there is no original
American philosophy, distinctive, such as one might expect of
our nation with its unique political history and frontier
life, but that it is almost wholly "based on the English and
Scottish tradition."^ He ment ions the two wa^'^'es of French
thought which passed over this country. The former, that of
free thought, ne identifies with English deism and Locke.
The second, that of the eclectic philosophy of Cousin and
Jouffroy,he labels as the Scottish realism af Reid and Stew-
art. Riley agrees v;ith Cohen's belief that the French thought
did not maintain a permanent foothold here. It never pene-
trated and via.3 soon defeated even in the woric of Jefferson
and in the strongholds of the Carolinas,by the v/ave of Scot-
tish Presbyterianism which swept southward from Princeton.
Cohen discusses the lack of (j-erman influence upon American
thought. He claims that the G-erman terras and mannerisms
brought here from aer-.iany by American professors were applied
I
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to the prevailing British Lradition. We see how this was
true in tne case of New England transcendentalism. He cites
the apologetic character of Marsh's introduction to Coleridge's
\ Aids to Reflection (lo29) as evidence of the entrenchment of
Locke and Re id in txiis country. He admits thau such radicals
as Theodore^arker showed an acquaintance with Herman philosophy,
but that American transcendentalism, though merging bits of Schel-
ling's romantic nature-philosophy, is really a form of Neopla-
tonism. Cohen cites Hickock's Rational Psychology (1848) as
the only American work in tne first two-t>iirds of the nineteenth
century to reveal direct Kantian influence, and this no more
than the British writings of Hamilton and Whewell. He claims
that the Hegelian influence evident in the work of William T-
Karris was even more patent in fjreat Britain.
2. Ort:-odoxy and Absorption in Material Conquest.
As obstacles to the spread of free speculative thought in
America, Cohen presents the absorption in material conquest and
the prevalence of narrow orthodoxy, which suspected idealism as
a road to pantheism, and empiricism as a road to atheism. Such
narrowness appealed the uncritical consciousness as a v/ay
to eliminate doubts, and it elevated disputable opinions to the
status of Indubitable principles.,
To such a type of mind, the Scottish commonsense realism v/as
welcome as the democratic philosophy. Cohen explains this con-
dition on the grounds that it was in harmony v/ith established
C
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Delief s, such as a literal interpretation of tiie Bible and
so witn the popular, uncritical views of the soul, the v/orld,
and iiod;and above all,th.-t it was "eninently teachable'.' The
last reason was a great advantage since clergynen held all
the chairs of philosophy, and a preaium was placed upon or-
thodoxy in educational institutions. It was indeed short-
sighted to ner;lect the search for truth in the supposed inter-
ests of pedagogj^.
3. Conparison of Riley's posiLion with That of Cohen.
Riley's stateaent, "Txie German influences on American
thought have oeen the most significant and the nost weighty
of all the forei^-n forces, ""'"leads us f'or a moment to wonder
why he stands in such apparent disagreement with Cohen. But
as we probe further into Riley's exposit ion, we find that he is
reall'- in substantial a-jreement v^ith Cohen. Altnour-,h Riley
is aware of the long period during which G-erman thought seeped
into America, he aprrees with Cohen that it was most indirect,
not .-.-losophical, 'rjtRnd that Kantian influence v;as
not felt lirectly in tM^? eastern part of the country until I876.
Riley --ives the 3t .Louis School the pioneer credit for the di-
rect introduction of Kant. Riley agrees with James Hurdock,
who considers that much of the reputed obscurity and unintel-
ligibility of G-erman t -ought in Enrlish translation is really
because of the inability of Lhe English language to form clear
1
Riley, AT, 229-
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metaphysical expression. Riley and Cohen both cite terapera-
irental differences and a "servile deference to English judg^
ment" as obstacles to the adoption of German thought here.
2
Riley observes that the "frigid condescension characteristic
of New England nipped the growth of the foreign plants." In
the last analysis, Riley agrees with Cohen in the direct pre-
dominance of Scottish influence: "It overran the country, and
had an exclusi\pe and preponderant influence well beyond the
centennial of the country* s independence."^ He too states
how powerfully the church and college combined to uphold or-
thodoxy and to hinder free speculation.
B. Exceptional Hinds during This Period of Pedantry.
Cohen considers the second quarter of the nineteenth -cen-
tury as an arid period in the field of philosophy, but he cites
as exceptions, the "acute" minds of Bowen,Mahan, Bledsoe, and
Tappan,and the "powerful" minds of Shedd and Hickock. He re-
commends Albert Bledsoe's Philosophy of Mathematics as still
worth reading, and cites Shedd* s Philosophy of History as evi-
dence of the inlependence of an evolutionary conception of his-
tory from the ^;7ork of Spencer and Darwin. Cohen rates Hickock
high in the statement that "for sheer intellectual power and
comprehensive grasp of technical philosophy," he was the fore-
most figure in American philosophy from Jonathan Edwards to the
Civil TTar. If we wonder why Cohen f.oea not mention Emerson,
we must remember that the latter was not one who formed a system
1 2 3 4
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of technical philosophy. In fact , Cohen, in a later reference
to Einer son, designates him as a seer or prophet.'''
C. The Beginnings of Modern -^imerican Philosophy.
Cohen places the .[genesis of raodern American philosophy in
the cont,roversy over evolution v/hich followed the publication
of Car-Tin's Qrinin of Species (1859) and Lyell's geology.
Thought divided into the rig]it wing, or tne dialectic evolution-
ism of Hegel, and the left wing, or the positivistic philosophy
of Comte, nil" , Lewes, Buclile, and Bain. The arguments based upon
evidences of design in the organic world gave place to the the-
ory of natural selection. Txie older deism was revived in the
view that the v;orld manifested an immanent power which expressed
i:-self in general lav;s re 'ealed to reason. The pioneers of the
modern movement v/ere John Fiske in the field of e'<'"61ut ionary -
phlloso/jhy, Chai-incey V^right in thf- field of scienLific empiri-
cism, and William T.Harris in the field of the Hegelian dialec-
tic. Cohen proceeds to discuss these thinkers in the order
named.
D. Tlie Philosophy of John Fiske (1842-1901).
l.Teleo.logical Evolution,
Fiske v;as a disciple of Spei-.cer, and neither , Cohen thinks,
rented new ideas in the realm of pure plillosophy, .
- ^:i?,sized the relativity- of human knowledge and the
-
-eory of T.ivf^rsal evolution. Evolution is made t eleological.
1
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human perfection being its goal. In his Outlines of Cosmic
Philosowliy , delivered as lectures at Harvard (1869-1871),
Fiske defends Spencer's agnosticism against anthropomorphic
theism. Thus he incurred the wrath of the orthodox, and ren-
dered a permanent position in the department of philosophy
impossible. This is one of Cbhen's numerous references to
the restraint of free expression in American institutions,
because of their theological back^^round. Fiske deals with
the problem of reconciling evil with a "benevolent, omnipotent,
quasi-psychical Power." This, we note, was the problem which
led to Chauncy's Benevolence of the Deity . and to Edwards's
placing the cause of evil beyond God. Fiske is not content
to leave the infinite unknowable as Spencer does. He ob-
serves an incompatibility between the personality and the
infinity of God. His conclusion i8 that of a cosmic imman-
ence. It is interesting tc note here that Riley points out
how Joseph Cook, a lecturer, attached the term, creative evolu-
tion, to Fiske' s view significant ^erm in the light of
Bergson's later contribution.
2. Ethical Implications of His Evolutionary Theory.
Fiske conceives of man's spiritual development as the goal
of evolution. His ethical teachings are considered common-
place by Cohen. Fiske adopts the popular conception of moral-
ity as the yielding to the "dictate-s of sympathy" rather than to
Ir
T
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"dictates of selfishness." He condemns the pnilosoDhy of
Voltaire as socially subverBive. He also opposes Cornte's
view of organizing society on the basis of scientific philo-
sophy. Ke conceives of social progress as an evolutionary
to a tneory of educat ion, but to his theory of social and mor-
al evolution. Fiske's interest in history led him to accept
evolutionary philosophy as a clue to the complicated mass of
facts presented in history.
3. Cohen's Opinion of Fiske.
Qohen's judgment of Fiske 's lucid and vigorous style is
nigher than that of his logic. He considers that the influenc
of the sixteen editir^ns of Cosmic Philosophy was very exten-
sive. However, ne criticizes his use of two inconsistent ar-
g^oments, viz. , Berkeleianism and psychical parallelism. Riley
does not mention tr.is inconsistency in his discussion of Fiske
in American Thought . Cohen credits Fiske with making fashion.-
able "the evolutionary myth," and for replacing the old"static
point of view with a nftw"dynamiti " orthodoxy . Riley considers
that Fiske provides tne clearest summary of the conflict be-
tween special creation and derivation. Because of this con-
1
troversial spirit, Royce calls his account rancorous.
E. The Philosophy of Chauncey Wright (l850-18Yb).
1. His Rejection of Spencer.
TiVright gave promise of developing Mill's logic v/hen he was
amelioration of tne human heart. not
1
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cut snort oy an ^antinely death. His writings are scarce, com-
prising only one volume, most of which was published in The
North American Review (I8b4-1673). He rejects the evolutionary
philosophy of Spencer rs an Inadequate grasp of modern physics,
and an extension beyond the bounds of known fact.
2. His Attitude toward Metaphysics.
Wrignt considers that a metaphysical picture of, the universe
is properly a function of religion or of poetic and myth-making
art. Nevertheless, he does not discredit metaphysics entirely,
but interprets its value pragmatically as instrumental to human
happiness. He assigns theological defense and hedonistic satis-
faction as tne motives of religious and metaphysical philosophy.
These mot ivat ions, we note in passing, are discussed by D.S.Robln-
1
son as some reasons why men philosophize. But, of course, we
1-mow that the true metaphysician seeks openmindedly for a com-
prehensive interpretation of tne nature of reality and the mean-
ing and goal of life. Wright concludes tnat the cnoice of met-
aphysical dogmas is a matter of character, not of logic. This
belief we find in James's philosophy.
3. Cohen's Distinctly High Appraisal of V/right.
Wrignt is treated briefly but most appreciatively by Cohen,
witness his lollo-'ing statement: "If ^.he test of a philosophy
be intellectual keenness and persistent devotion to tne truth
rather than skill in making sweeping generalizations plausible,
Cnauncey Wright deserves a foremost place in American philosophy.
1
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Thls criterion is typical of Cohen's sincerity and originali-
ty of appraisal. He views with contempt superficiail general-
izations, and altiiough very comprehensive in iiis exposition of
all types, he favors the posit ivistic and the empirical more than
tne theological and the netaphy sical. Cohen's championship of
Wright is not borne out by Riley, who does not discuss him at all.
Cohen admits that ne is attractive only to the select who do not
expect philosophy to confirm beliefs and to offer a simple sys-
tem. He points out right's anticipation of James and I^ewey in
his interpretation of general laws as finders, not as summaries,
of the trutn. Cohen rejoices in tne direct and fruitful influ-
ence of t:.is devotee of scientific speculation upon Charles Peirce.
p. The Philosophy of William T. Harris (1H35-1909).
Cohen values the influence of Harris as an interpretep, en-
thusiast, organizer, and edit or, rather than as an original think-
1
er. Riley agrees in emphasizing his Instrumental value.
1. His Dialectical Refutation of Spencerian Agnosticism.
Cohen discusses the attack made Dy Harris against the agnos-
ticism of iapencer, viz
.
, tne assumption that vie cannot conceive
the infinite. His psychological argument accuses Spencer and
Hamilton of confusing tne processes of conception and imagina-
tion. His objective argument is dialectical. The finite par-
ticular of sense-perception is not the ultimate reality, but is
given on the stage of atomism. The understanding, on the stage
i
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of pant ne ism, views the activity of every finite object to be
gained from sone otner object. The reason, on the stage of the-
ism, viev;s tne ultiaate source as unlimited by any external ob-
ject, and tnerefore infinite or self-limited Activity. Cohen
iiputes to Harris tne Hegelian intellectualizat ion of religion
and art by interpreting their function as the revelation of philo-
sopnic truth, rle accuses nim of the fallacy , which ne tninks is
common to "all Hegelians and most believers in tne adequacy of
one system," viz., of tninicing "he has gained insight v/hen he has
translated a fact into his own terminology."''' Conen appears to
be anti-Hegelian in his sympathy.
2. The Influence of Harris in Education and in Journalism.
Cohen considers that t,he influence of harrls is greater than
one v7ould expect from reading his works v/nicK sound "rather ob-
solete and somewhat mechanical" today. ^ he is to be noted chief-
ly as tne intellectual leader in the professior'. of education in
the United Stated from 1867-1910, the chief organizer of the School
of Concord, and the eoltor, from 18d7-1893, it>f the Journal o f Spec-
ulative Pnilosophy , the first journal In tne Sngiish language
w.-ich was cevotee exclusively to philosophy. Tnrougn this organ
and other v/ritings, Harris brougnt before the Anerican people an
exposition of G-reek and 'J-erman Philosophy. Riley evaluates high-
ly tne work of tne St. Louis School in its pioneer interpretation
of Kant In ti:ie United States^ The Journal also was of value,
Cohen notes, in publishing the first papers of reirce,Koyce, and
1
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Ja-ies. rLile^' adds tne na:ae of Ho\7ison to this list. Riley
calls Har'-'ls "the Interpreter of tiie tiiought of his country,
v/.iethsr r^ast or '.V'- st . ""^ Certainly such "oloneer ^7ork in tne
Interpretation of (ferman tnought v/as of value in supplement-
ing the influence of Scottish realise in tlie United States.
Riley considers that Brocicraeyer, an unlettered but speculative
thinker, vras the oracle which Harris interpreted. Cohen does
-lOt discuss 3roclaieyer.
1. Systeias of philosophy in the Leading Colle,res in the Late
nineteenth Century.
1. Slow Prof;',ress in the Field of Education.
Cohen calls attention to the larj; of educational institutions
behind the developaent of tliought. Progress v/as aade late in
the nineteenth century through the ap'^^ointnent of a layman,
Charles Sliot,as president of Harvard (1869), and the establish-
ment of post-graduate instruction at Johns Hopkins (I876).
T-iis latter date is the one adopted by Riley as the bep-inning
of the direct flernan influence in the eastern part of the Unitdd
States. Cohen discusses the spread of fierman idealisra through
:,he English and Scottish unlver sit les, and the triumph of ideal-
ism in tnis country during the first decade of the publication
of The Philosophical Review, founded in l892,v/ith Jacob G-ould
and Ja.'ies Creighton as edi-.ors. As Cohen considers this jour-
nal "open to scholarly contributions in all the various fields
of philosophy," he judges its articles as weighty evidence of
1
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tne dominance of Kantian and Hegelian tnought.
2. At Harvard.
At Harvard College, Francis Bov^en's opposition to O ialectic
Heselianisa and tne nind-pn '.losophy of the British empiricists,
v,-as followed by George H. Palmer's acceptance of Hegelianisn
introduced at Harvard by G#C. Everett in 1869.
3. At Princeton.
At Prineet on, Janes McCosh defended Scottish commonsense real-
ism according to tradition. Riley points out the influence hepe
of Witherspoon, a descendant of John Knox, who came from Scotland
to accept the presidency of Princeton in 1768, whereupon he drove
out Berkeleianisra."^ Cohen explains I.Ic§osh's attempt to reconcile
evolutionary philosophy v;ith ortnodoxy, and his attacks upon all
opponents including Hegelians. McCoah, according to Kiley, con-
sidered that realism as taught at Princeton was what an American
2philosophy should be. This sentiment, we note, would accord
with that of the man on the street, but not necessarily with that
of tae philosophical type of nind. In criticism of I.IcCosh's at-
teppt to harmonize religion and evolution, as Cohen mentioned,
Riley observes that he "transmogrified mechanical evolution in-
to what he called a Christian evolution."^ Riley considers
that in substituting Providence for creation and in failing to
grasp the idea of immanence, IlcCosh held the eight eenth, not the
nineteenth century, view of evolution. Ormond, according to 6o-
hen, expanded realism ',vith Berke] <eian and Kantian elements.
1 2 3
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4. At Yale.
At Yale, Noah Porter, vrhose works reveal a clear understanding
of G-erman idealism as well as British empiric ism, adnered substan-
tially to Scottish intuitive philosophy, and opposed popular ag-
nosticism and materialism.
Altiiough Cohen recognizes the profession of G-eorge Trumbull
Ladd to eclecticism, he declares that he is a follower of Lotze.
His spiritual metaphysics is based upon epistemology in Kantian
fasriion. Cohen recognizes his leadership in physiologic psy-
chology and asserts that his philosophy stands for criticism
of the procedures and the fundamental ideas of the sciences.
Riley discusses this stand more fully and points out Ladd's
emphasis on the empirical data for philosopny, and also on the
synthesis of scientific re suit s."^ Riley points out hov; Ladd
achieves uiiity through personalism. He likens him to Royce in
conceiving the world as mecrianical when considered as an ob-
ject by itself, but as self-like when considered as an entity
2known to man. Cohen deprediates Ladd's int ellectualism bj''
calling his Idealism a branch of modern Christian a.jologetics.
^e says that Ladd's chief interest v/as in making better Christian
citizens.
5» At Boston University.
Cohen's reference to Borden Parker ?;0wne of Boston Univer-
sity^brief but high in its praise. He calls him "one of the
keenest of American metaphysicians
. He mentions Bowne as a
more direct follower of Lotze than was Ladd.
1 3
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H. The Philosopiii'- of Charles S. Peirce (1840-1914).
1. Cohen's High Evaluation of Peirce.
Concerning the ricimess and varietj'" of Peirce' s thought,
Cohen states, "If philosophic eninence were raeasured not by
the number of finished treatises of dignified length but by
the extent to v;hich a man brought fortrh new and fruitful ideas
of radical importance, then Charles S. Peirce (1840-1914) would
easily be the greatest figure in American philosophy."" Cohen
attributes his inconsistency and his obscurity to the fact
that because of unconventional morality and "inability to work
in harness, " he was deprived of the opportunity to nold an
academic position. Yet , according to Cohen's later observation
regarding academic pedantry, this very deprivation may have
been an advantage.
2. Diversity of Talent.
Peirce' 3 chief concern was with the philosophy of science.
He v/as master of mathematics, logic, photometric astronomy, geodesy
psycho-physics, and philology. The field of mathematical logic
developed 'by him is nov/ used by neo-realisra. R.B.Perry men-
tions nis founding of "symbolic logic."
3» Originator of Pragmatism.
Tne C--ief influence of Peirce has been evident in the de-
velopment of pragmatism. In a little club of which Chauncey
V/right v/as txie dominating personality, Peirce became interested
in tne translation of general propositions into prescriptions
1
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for obtainins new facts. He formulated the general maxlia
of pra3;-'iatisni, viz. , tnat tne meaning of any concept is to be
found in "all the conceivable experimental phenomena, which
the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply. This
maxim ^/as developed "by James, but the latter differed in many
ways from Peirce,who preferred to call his philosophy prag-
2
maticism. Peirce emphasizes the good in general ideas rather
than in individual, segregated react inns, v;hich, as Cohen states,
reminds one strongly of the central ideas in Santayana's philo*-
sopliy. Contrariwise, Ja;:ies ' s emphasis is on the particular,
sensible experience. Royce does not value Peirce primarily as
the founder of pragmatism, but rather as a logician.
^
4. Kis Tychism.
Cohen praises Peirce for opposing "that sacred cow of philo-
sopiiy, " the belief in eternal lav7s,and for substituting the pri-
macy of mind and chance. Peirce consider9 that law is merely an
accidental variation which has gr07m habitual with things. Co-
hen mentions that this tychism is used by James in releasing men
from a "block universe."
5. His Influence on James.
Riley discusses the influence of Peirce on James, and points
out tne differences between their views, among which is Peirce 's
disagreement with James's assumpti-n that the end of man is ac-
tion. Riley agrees with Cohen on Peirce* s interpretation of the
meaning of a concept, not in individual react ions, but in the way
'ironist, XVI, 162. Wce,|IG, 114-117.
a
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those reactions contribute to the development of concrete
reasonableness
.
Kogers points out the influence upon James of Peirce's
metaphysical doctrine of tne real presence of chance in the
v/orld. He says that Peirce's pragmatism is a doctrine of the
meaning of ideas rather tnan of truth. Peirce would call
truth "the mental state at which inquiry aims," the satis-
faction derived from the ultimate pushing of inquiry far e-
2
nough,the consensus of opinion among scientific minds. V/hat
James appropriated were the "practical bearings, " a matter of
supererogation with Peirce. This opinion is in agreement with
Cohen's. Rogers proceeds further in pointing out Peirce*
s
belief that the will should exercise eautious doubt and v.'eigh
reasons, as opposed to James's will to believe. Peirce denies
the creation of thought by its own object. Rogers also em-
pkasises -Peirce ' s adherence to the truth v/hether it was in the
interests of society or not. He v/as not, we note, a social prag*.
matist like Dewey.
6. Opinions of Other Critics.
Perry, Riley, and "^^ogers agree with So.ien on a high evalua-
tion of Peirce's v/ork. Riley says that his aim was less sel-
fish than is usually thought and his spirit less practical than
general. Perry refers t>o Peirce as a scholar of great eru-
dition and originality." Cohen considers that he was"en-
dowed with the bountiful but capricious originality of genius.""
1 3 5
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Robinson calls hia "one of the greatest American philosophers."-
Mumford considers Peirce as a lonely voice between the prag-
matists who dominated tne foreground and the tninkers who were
searching for a background. Mumford pays tribute to his precise
2
and deep thinking, what his own age sorely needed but overlooked-
We note here that the Harvard University Press is now publish-
ing Peirce 's works for the first time.
I. The Philosophy of Josiah Royce (1885-1916).
1. Metaphysical Idealism.
Cohen's discussion of Royce 's idealism is comprehensive and
appreciative. Royce 's earliest puolished papers revealed a
Kantian denial of the possibility of ultimate metaphysical solu-
tions except by ethical postulates. His first book The Religious
Aspect of rhilosopriy (1^85) reveals the author as "a full-
fledged metaphysical idealist," who contends that the possibil-
ity of error requires the presupposition of absolute truth and
an aosolute knower. Tne world must be either of the same nature
as our minds or else unknowable, or as Thilly say s, explaining
Royce, "An existence that has no r.iental attribute is to me wholly
opaque. "-^
2. The Spirit of IJodern Philosophy .
Conen describes The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892) as
"an unusually eloquent "book. This opinion is borne out by
Lewisohn's remark that Royce' s treatises "both for structural
order and textual eloquence are far above any other prose of
1 : 2— 3
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his tiae."
Golien p Dints out the enphasis in '.his v/ork of the vrlll
rather than knowledge. The Berkeleian concept of the world
as ireas is accepted. Royce reco2;nizes the tragic fact of
experience, viz., that there is no complete satisfaction for ef-
fort aiid passionate toil;yet he conceives of the "eternal frus-
t'^ation of our ideals or vTila." 'as enrichin;]; to life. This re-
A
cognition of the facts of experience, we note, is e:i/irical.
Perry states that there i^ 'Rlistic and erapirical flavor"
to Royce' s • ... .^raises Royce for starling
v/ith enpirical reality ^-^ This recor^niti ;n of evil is contrary
4
to the excesFive optinisn or indifference of EnersOn* Robin-
son interprets .\0yGe's p.cceptance of evil as i-ietarl.y sically
real but as conquered by the Absolute. Cohen points out the
principle of social or cosnic suf f erinp", the suffering of the
Absolute because of evils resulting from ignorance and against
the v;ill. Lewisohn's comnent, typical of his contempt for the
Puritanic emphasis on sin pnd f':uilt,is pertinent h^-re: "He car§d
little about the freedom of the v.-ill, for he was a good man not
eager to assign guilt and mete out punishment."^
3 . The '.7orld and the Individual .
Cohen emphasizes Royce' s indebtedness to Peirce, v/hich becomes
explicit in fhe World and the Indivic^ual (2 volumes, 1901 ) . Here
the Absolute is reconciled vritn the Individual by the analogy
of ;..ie relat,ion of mat-heiiat ical ini:..^^L.y to one of its finite
1
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parts. '•o'/6irer,Ko: '-^e " '^-^^"^.2 -"'"o.i Peirce in att, en-^-^t, ing to
reconcilejthe reaiitj of abst-ract, logical and raatheuiat. leal
anlversals with Berkelelan ic'.eas. Cohen questions this re-
conciliation. Rogers ^raises Royce rfor going beyond aany
English Hegelian if eallst s, and g>-appling with the problem of
1
the individual and the Absolute.^ Thilly points out noY; each
finite individual in the Absolute contains a copy in itself
of the Absolute. Such an interpretation recainds us of Emer-
son.^ Robi .son Mentions the development of the coherence cri-
terion in Lhis v/ork."^ Cohen does not.
4. Subsequent Work: Mathenat leal-Logical and Ethical-Religious.
Cohen classifies Royce 's subsequent v/ork under mathematical-
logical and et.-ical-religious. The essay on logic in The Ency-
clopedia of the Philosoohical Sciences is chosen as an example
of theformer group. In this essay, logic is treated as the most
general science of objective ord^r. His arguraent, Cohen notes,
is on a perfectly realistic basis and is in no way affected by
his professed adherence to idealism. Cohen is particularly
appreciative of this fact. In these v;rltings, Royce exercised
an Influence on neo-realisni.
The Problem of Christianity (1913) >^Q.yce' s last book, is se-
lected as representative of the second group. Here is found
an interpretation of Pauline concepts by social psychology
j
and th^oersonality of Christ is considered only as the embodi-
ment of the spirit of a beloved community. We are reminded
1 3
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here of i^i.ierson's protest ar.ainst tne historical emphasis
upon t.:e person of Jesus. "" ^^obinson, in discussing Royce,
speaks of the ''blessed conimunity which transcends every fi-
nite social order and constitutes the essence of 'j-od.'
Cohen does not? laention Royce' s theory of interpretation
as a higher f^anction than either perception or conception*
This theory and that of the aigns which determine interpreta-
3tion were derived frora Peirce.
3» Historical Influence.
*
Cohen considers that Royce influenced historically the
Bpread of two opposing forces to twentieth-century idealism, viz.,
pragnat ism, by his eraphasis on the ethical and the practical
aspect of i("eas,and neo-realism, by his teaching and writings
concerning natneaat ical logic. The latter influence v^as a
continuation of that of Peirce. Robinson states that neo-
4
realism "arose as a polemic against Roycian Absolute Idealism."
R.3. Perry considers that such absolutism contains three root-
le
defects: fornalism, equivocation, and dogmatism. Santayana
criticizes Royce' s incompatible comoination of the Absolute
6
and of social realism. This seems to us a valid criticism.
We note that Qohen does not discuss Royce 's theory of error
or his Philosophy of Loyalty .
6. G-eneral Characterization of Royce.
Robinson characterizes Royce as "one of the ablest teachers
1 ~ 5
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of philosophy this country has produced.""^ Lev/ison calls
Aim "perhaps the most powerful writer of tne period" be-
2
tween the Civil and Spanish Wars. Ke also describes him as a
an"ideali3t of a rather exorbitant type, " v/hich opinion
would be in accord with Cohen, v/ho, nevertheless says, "rie contin-
ued to represent,, against the p;rov;ing tide of ant i- intellectual-
ism, the old faith in the cir^nity anc. potency of r-^ason which
4
is the cornerstone of humanistic liberalism."
J. The Philosophy of William Janes (1842-1910).
l.Tlarly Influences.
"The miion of relirious mysticism v^ith biologic and psy-
chologic empiricism is characteristic of James's v;ork from the
r
very beginning.""^ Cohen points out the Swedenborgian atraos-
piiere of his early home, the learning of thdart of observing
details fro.i tlie teaching of Louis Asassiz,tne tendency of the
companionship of Cliauncey V/right anc'. the reaaing of Kenouvier
to lead him av/ay from nonism, and nis personal inclination for
Hume and Hill. Lewisolin adc s anotJier early influence, viz
.
, th^t
of an "auto-therapeutic effort" to free himself fro:i o.-c- per-
plexities of met: Ics and so fron ill health, by his deter-
iiined exercise of the freedom of the •vill. As his metaphysical
iAquiries -.vere associated witi: —^' ef' ^r.:'' pair, whereas faith
in his ^vill saved him from sucii rouble, Janes accepted the wor-
Icing of tne irlll as truth. ^ This interpretation seems to us
plausible vhen vie consider the despair to wliich many persons
1 ^ T- 5
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are driven by their early speculative thought.
2. His Principles of rsycnolopy .
Cohen selects James's Principles of PsycholopLY (2 volumes
lb90) as best to illustrate his chief contribution to the
realm of philosophy. Jaraes accepts Spencer's view that
thought is developed by an evolutionary process and is
biologic in functioning. However, for James, the body is an
instrument of the mind and the latter may be freed from the
former at death, and express itself in some "celestial" form.
Conen mentions James's oelief in the "survival of conscious-
2
ness bmyond death." In the Principles of Psychology , James
answers the idealistic argument that relations are of non-
empirical cnaracter,b5i attributing to the connecting rela-
tions themselves a "psychological status on a par with the
tnings they connect.''-^ His conception of ideas and things
DOth as experiences, Cohen thinks, has aptly been called
neutral monism and thus likened to txie pnilosophy of Ernst
Mach. Perry , Sellars, and Russell consider that James is the
founder of neo-realism. His simple elements of pure ex-
perience out of which all transient ent it ies, , including
consciousness of individuals, are made, is called by W.M.
4
Sheffer "neutral entities. Hasan agrees
Robinson, ILP, 1^8.
Ibid., 250. Ibid., 203.
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with this assumption of James's influence. Cohen does not
express his opinion on this issue.
3. His Varieties of Relip;ious Experience .
J ame 3 * s Varieties of Religious Experience ( 1 9 02 ) does not
treat the spread and vitality of historic religions, but shows
interest chiefly in psychology, part icularly in the extraordin-
ary type of human being. Cohen remarks that James reveals no
"pride of the intellect." This, to be sure, is a virtue, but one
which may inhere not only in empiricists.
We note here that Koyce believes that James's emphasis on
the particular and the individual in religion leaves it to
caprice. However, inadequate and chaotic as his philosophy
seems to Royce,the latter maintains that it is not to be re-
jected, but viewed as an aid to finding truth.^
4. Cohen's iixuosition of Various Criticisms of James.
Cohen leaves his own treatment of James to consider vari-
ous criticisms of the latter 's views. He observes the con-
sternation which has resulted from James's neglect to indi-
cate the relative importance of results. He does not clear-
ly differentiate between causes of belief and evidences of the
truth we believe. Cohen thinks that he cevoted too much p^ner-
to opposing the theory of the tr^th of ideas as inert copies
of reality. Altnough pra^^matism is regarded as James's view,
it is merely the method leading to his radical empiric ism, ac-
cording to Conen.
_ -
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It has been proposed that James has done away with the t?radl-
tional netaphyaical problem, the relation of mind and body and
the need for an Absolute. According to James, experience is
not to be defined but to be lived. But, as Cohen aasert s, "just
what experience Is, James does not tell us» Yet Rogers statas
that "In consenting to sacrifice the autonomy and Independence,
and creatlveness of man to the craving for a mystical and re-
ligious union with the divine, James comes so close after all
to the Absolutism of Koyce,that it is hard to detect differences
of pragmatic importance*" Such apparent inconsistencies lead
us to see why Howisan classes James as a great thinker but not
ai a philosopher."^ Howlson's contention is that he did not pos-
sess a mastery of logic and did his best to discredit itfbut
Cohen considers such criticism to be unfair, for James elabor-
ated definite doctrines regarding the nature of the mind, truth,
and reality; he showed dialectical skill in thw works, Radical
Empiricism and The Meaning of Truth ; and he discredited not
logic in general, but only the logic of "vicious intellectual-
ism." Tnilly calls James's philosophy antl-lntellectuallstlc
because, in order t,o be true. It must satisfy other than intel-
lectual or logical demands* The intellect is not his only
judge of truth.
Howison's criticism is significant in its differentiation
Detween "philosophy as technique and philosophy as vision."
Cohen answers that James was aw^are of technique, but Interestfkd
1 2 3
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in philosophy as a religions vision of life. Thilly
points out how all James's philosophy is rooted in the will
to believe, and that theism is the only conception that sat-
is fies his emotional and volitional nature.''' Rogers also
cites the religious motive as James's philosophical pt?e-
pference.
Cohen disagrees -nlth Flournoy^s opinion that James aerived
ills caraxnai ue±j.^t'3 from the main current of Christian
thought. He claims that James is not orthodox, but inclined
to accept G-od as tne Deity to whom men pray. He is more
definiteljf opposed to Hegelian and Roycian Absolutism than
to popular unbelief. Thus we see his psychological empha-
sis on the empirical. He opposes Absolutism because of its
"insufferable pretension to finality of proof, "and because
of his own preference for an anthropomorphic universe.
Cohen does not treat specifically Roj^-ce's opinion of
James, but we mention it here. Royce considers that James
is the third in the line of the three great classic philoso-
phers in America. Royce calls James a creative thinker and
an interpreter of his age. In opj^osition to this view, we
cite Muniora'tt opinion that James did not create, but that he
reported the thought of the "gilded age." I.Iumford construes
the Whole pragmatic movement as one of acquiescence to the
post-Civil War discount of the ideal.
5. S^ommary of Cohen's Own Appraisal.
Cohen's own constructive appraisal of James follov/s.
i 2 3
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Altllough he considers that his place in the history of met-
aphysics is still a matter of debate, he >^eems him worthy to
occupy a place beside Emerson as a seer or prophet. This re-
minds us of the ppinion of Howison, observed above. '
Cohen observes a note of obscurantism in his attitude
toward logic and "over-beliefs." Rogers agrees in noting
obscurity and confusion in James's logic. Rogers thinks that
the right to extend belief beyond evidence in cases of mo-
mentous issues may be ad venturous, but it may lead to rashness
resulting in calamity, as, for example, to believe that a chasm
ten feet wide is only five feet wide and to act accordingly.
But Rogers comir.ends Jaines's inculcation of a sense of propor-
tion by avoiding preoccupation with trivialities of logic
outside of human interests. Nevertheless, he notes how this
tendency to minimize exact logical analysis affects the
value of philosophical constructions. 3 in this connection,
we note Riley's observation that faith and not logic de-
cides questions for James. But, as Lewisohn remarks, v/e need
to know whose faith in what . Although James's sp'rcial
faith saved him from folly, the faith of the burners of here-
tics also gave the believers satisfaction. Lewisohn recog-
nizes the need for an objective standard of truth and morali-
ty. 5 We present these opinions as a supplement to those
expressed by Cohen.
1 3 5
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Conen conaidera that tae cnief effect of James's work is
"to raise the standard of intellectual honesty and courage.
Cohen "believes Lhat the ton© and manner of philosophical
writing has been transformed by "th© width and depth of his
sympathies andjt'ie irresistible magic of his words^" and that
his influence outside America is impressive and steadily in-
creasing.
Lewi3ohn*s evaluation is not so high. He claims that prag-
matism "abandons both the search for spiritual and intellec-
tual values as v;ell as the critical spirit. It damns dis-
interestedness," and therefore is an excellent delineation of
present-day American thought. In this same connect ion, he also
writes, "The suspicion that in the "best of all possible worlds
we were running the best of all possible civilizations straight
to a millenium of righteousness and increased profits that
gentle suspicion had now received the stamp of philosophical
truth. "^
Riley considers that it is a shallow belief wnich James
takes from Spencer regarding the preservation of our remote
ancestors* ideas. Riley asks why these surviving coramon-
sense principles are fit. Conen does not discuss this point.
We conclude tnis discussion with Conen 's observation that
James's writings are "rich in tne variety of factual insight
but not in effective answers to the searching criticisms of
5
men like Roy ce, Russell, and Bradley.
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K. The Philosophy of John Dewey(16D9- /•
1. Tne eeriLor of a School of Philosophy.
Cohen introduces John Dewey as "the only American alsout
wnom has "been formed a regular philosophic school.""^ In Ri-
ley's American Thouf^ht» however, the Cambridge School is con-
sidered as one formed about James jbut James's theories had
so much variety that he is claimed as the founder of a type
of pragmatism, and also by a group of his leading students, as
the foijinder of neo-realism. In regard to Dewey's School*
Perry ana LiOvejoy believe that it will not maintain itself
as such, but that its idealistic and realistic elements will
be absorbed respectively by exponents of these two philosophic
2
types.
2. Relation to Hegelian Aosolutlsm.
Cohen states that Dewey's early writin^^s reveal a masoci-y
ot Hegelian dialectic. Idealistic elements persist in hii
view of remodelling the world by thought, and in his organic
point of view; but in the latter, Dewey ' s emphasis is on the
changing "situation" rather than on the Absolute, which he
ignores. Concerning this issue, Rogers states tnat Dewey, com-
ing to pragmatism by zuv «cij of English Hegelianlsm, "inher-
ited Its lack of concern for t^e conueci-xoxi of Knowledge with
a human knower."^ Riley claims that Dewey is not inclined to
disparage a certain type of Absolutism, viz., that of an immanent
1 r
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rational principle which performs the natural select ing."^
3. His naturalism.
Dewej'- ' s main v/opk is represented by Cohen as thoroughgo-
ing naturalism. According to his view, the supernaturalism
latent in idealism is incompatible v/ith a naturalistic ac-
count of the origin of human thought. He accepts James's
view of the bivo^ogic function of thought, and applies philoso-
phical technique to the exposition of that view. Thus it has
received more attention from professional philosophers. Dev;ey
replaces the method of mathematics and ptiyaica by that of
natural history. He relies upon the Darwinian method to devel-
op philosophical ideas from the discovery of ideas in their
natural state. But, as we nave noted aDOve,Jaraea D^lievea that
the mind may be immortal; whereas Dewey rejects immortality as
an outv/orn view. As Cohen joints out, Janes uses pragmatism to
Justify the claims of supernaturalism; whereas Devrej uses it to
eliminate all theological problems. Dev/ey is indebted to James's
Principles of Psychology , but he is an independent ally rather
than a disciple. James '.'as later indebted to ^ewey ' s doc-
trine of instrumental! siQ. Dewey's instrumentalism eliminates
the concepts of G-od, freedom, and immortality , as having outlived
tneir usefulness. Ke does not go so far even as Chauncey
Wright, wno acKnov/leages tneir value as a contriuuLion to nu-
man happiness.-^ Dewey iiaa no use for t,ne "consolation" of pnii-
osopiiy . rte advocates the use of ideas in transforming the
i 2
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eapirical world. In fact,ne considers that the only reason
we tnink Is because v.'e are forced to do so by some obstacle
'7nich stands In the v/ay of our physical adjustment. We ".ote
that he Irnores all speculation of a contemplative type, all
mystical meditation. As Riley says in this connect ic&n, Dewey
goes to extremes in cold reasoning and does not give due cred-
it to Grod, freedom, and im;:iortality^ experienced as emotional.
He has no use for sanctions of sent iment, and is an iconoclast
of beliefs that transcend his metliod.-^ Rofi^ers says that if
beliefs do not conform to Dewey's arbitrary definitions, he
blames the beliefs.^
4. His Realism.
Cohen asserts that Dewey is a professed realist. He holds
that thought is an outi rowth of tae pre-existing v^orld upon
v/hicn it reacts. Lovejoy claims tnat witnm nis pragmatism
are both Idealistic and realistic doctrines, which are contra-
3dictory. Cohen recognizes some of these apparent adherences
to idealism, but he does not explicitly condemn them as contra-
dictory.
5. Dev/ey ' s Neglect of Values.
Cohen says nothing exolicit concernin,-^ Dewey's neglect of
values. Rogers, nowever, discusses this limitation at some
length. He says tnat a scientist maj^ ignore epistemology,
1 2 3
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but that a philosopher should consider total reality.
Rogers claims that he haa no right to insist that ethical
edification is- the onlj legitimate problem. Rogers main-
tains that the status of values is presunnosed by the valu-
ing activity and not merely brought about by that activity
as an instrument of physical adjustment."^
6. Dewey's Extensive Influence.
Cohen says of Deue^- that "Judged by the ever increasing
number and contagious zeal of nis disciples, Dewey has proved
to be the most influential philosopher that America has yet
2produced." It is interesting to note the various criterions
used hj Cohen tnrougnout tnis chapter in making his superla-*
tive Judgments. Cohen accounts for Dewey * a influence by his
rare personal qualities as a teacher, his opportune appeal to
the prevailing distrust of other-worldliness, the popularity
of utilitarianism, the contempt of the practical man for the
visionary and for idle play, and the optimism which sees suc-
sess as the reward for intellir.ent effort. V/e are reminded
of McGosh's tribute to Scottish realism as the proper phil-
osopjiy for America. Lev/isohn recognizes this representa-
tion of Americanism in Dev;ey, refers, to hira as "the philo-
sophical spokesman of the age, " and goes on to say that "this
pnilosophy interprets good and ill almost, if not quite, in the
terms of v/hat seemed good and ill to G-eorge Babbitt of Zenith.
_
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He claims that "the triumph of tnis philosophy consists
in its failure to define the 'good' and 'ill' and 'de-
sirable in tne present' of which it speaks," but that it
implies what is desirable to a hustling citizenry. Af-
ter observing how the disciples of Dewey have clearly
eliminated ultimate questions from philosophy ,Lewisohn
exclaims, "No wonder that vie have an age of gin and moral
confusionl . . . .The stronger novelists of our contemporary
period are more philosophical than the philosophers I ""^
Dewey's Literary Style.
In regard to Dewey's style of expression, Cohen observes
that it is "fragmentary , highly technical, and without any
2
extraneous graces of style," and this statement is borne
out by Lewisohn's comment, "Until the days of Professor
Dewey and nis disciples and tne reduction of philosophy
to a tool in a world of go-getters, America has always been
happy in ne literary quality of her pnilosophers . "-^
Lewisonn and Cohen remind us of the grace of Edv-ards's
mystical writings, of the vigor of Flske,of the charm of
Royce and James, and of the poetic artistry of Santayana.
d. Conen's G-eneral Appraisal.
Cohen gives Dewey credit for eliminating the cosmic
drama in wnicn persons nad such an infinitesimal sig-
nificance.
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Cohen considers that the nost significant feature his-
torically^ of Dev/e^'s influence is the rallying of those "who
still believe in the cause of liberalism based on faith in the
value of intellectual enlightenment."-^ Vve are reminded of
Cohen's tributes to the Intellects of V/right , Peirce, Koyce, ana
James.
L. T^*e Philosophj' of James Kark Baldwin.
Cohen devotes one oarap;raph only to the philosophy of Bald-
win, wrio followed Darv/in"s evolutionary philosophy even ;:iore
closely than did Janes and Dewey. Thoup;hts and Thinizs ( 1911)
Cohen characterizes as "one of tne most ooscure books v/ritten
in America," containing a "system of evolutionary social psy-
cnolOj^ witii a vei-y eiaoorate tecnnical terninoiogy and anal-
ytic scaffoldini<. ""^ It v/as, "..owever, appreciated in Fi-ance and
Germany v/here "ranslations have been nade, A more intelligible
viev/ of this system appears in the Tenet ic Theory of Reality
(1915) -i-n which the tneorjj of pancalisn is developed. This
cneory noids tnat Lxie esthetic consciousness is primary. Rob-
inson interprets Baldwin's pancaiism as Implying that the es-
Lnetic conserves ootn trutn and utility, and is more profound
than eitner.'^ Riley votes a section of American Thought to
a discussion of IBaldv/'in's use of Darv/inism. Cohen states
that .^aldv;in's emijnasis on the jlay element is ur.lque m
American jjnjLioso.-uiy
. He neglects to mention tne Dictionary
of PniiQsopny and PsycnolOK.y»
i 3~
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The Philoaophy of Oearge Santayana.
1. Reasons for Including Santayana in This Survey.
Cohen openg tnls discussion of Santayana by the observation,
"The philosophic temper of an age can be Judged by the kind of
merit it neglects as well as by what it wors^ilps."^ He states
that the name of Santayajia has not been included in surveys of
philosophy. Therefore Cohen takes particular care to devote
several pages to Santayana. He believes it to be especially
appropriate to include Santayana, though a living author, for he
believed wnen he wrote Lhis chapter in 1919 that Santayana'
s
future career would not belong to America. His prophecy has
been fulfilled; for shortly afterward Santayana went to England
to assume nis residence*
2. His Artistic View of Philosophy.
Santayana* s conception of philosophical t.hought is artittic.
He aims to present a picture of the whole of human experience;
and in this "genial" observation of totality, he is not disturbed
by unsolved problems, the "Babel of society," and Dewey's anathe-
mas against Lhe purely contemplative. He conceives of the proper
achievement of nappiness through the "inner landscape," not
through outer comforts. Witn Sant,ayana, philosophy is not only
a means to improve life, but it is itself a "more intense life."
He views art as inconsequential and abstract, not concerned
with influencing the world, but as providing us witn the best
nint of ultimate good, and therefore an incentive to continue
1
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human toil. His view of eatnetlcs reminds us of Baldwin,
who evaluates beauty above utility and truth. ^ Of course
this view is snarply opposed to Dewey's instrumental ism.
Santayana believes tnat poetic sug^^eation is more richly
liberating to zne human soul than the useful but fragmentary
liberation offered by science. We note here a similarity to
Chauncey Wright's evaluation of religion and metaphysics as
2
nigher than science in producing human happiness.
3. Naturalism Combined with an Appreciation of Other-
worldliness.
Cohen considers that the distinguishing mark of Santayana
is nls combination of naturalism with an appreciation of
other-worldliness. His metaphysics contains no supernatural-
ism. His naturalism is even more pronounced than Dewey's in
its belief tnat mind is an effect of biologic evolution. As
Rogers points out, he considers that matter is the only causal
agent, that consciousness is a natural product, and that it re-
ports what goes on in the organism.^ However, it is signifi-
cant, as Cohen points out, that Jiantayana differentiates be-
tween tne origin and tne validity of ideals. This is cer-
tainly an important distinction. Santayana realizes tnat the
best la not always the latest in development. He rejects the
identification of the ideal with the real, as in Hegel. Yet
Rodinson asserts that altnough Santayana ridicules Absolutism,
he incorporates its essential ideas into his own so-called
1 2 3
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1
critical realism*
Conen obaervea tnat Santayana is saved from tne melancholy
of moat naturalists by accepting tne u-reek distinction between
the brute existence anfi the form of things.
We add here the comment of Rogers that tiantayana considers
consciousness useless, but not worthless. In fact, he thinks
p
that it is tne only seat and source of worth.
4. His Respect for Traditional Wisdom.
Another distinguishing trait of siantayana is his respect
for traditional wisdom. It seems to us that in tnis age of
cutting loose from bonds of restraint , sucn a respect provides
good balance. Santayana, instead of rebelling, seeks a congenial
type of restraint. Such cnaracteristlcs are believed by Cohen
to reveal Santayana** Latin and Catnolic inheritance.
Lewiaohn refers to his disdain for the G-ermanic "World of
Streben" as neathen and turbulent. Lewisohn considers that
he worsnips his picture of tne Latin civilization with "poetic
passion.
Santayana emphasizes how reflection can distinguish the ideal
fpom tne physical emoodiment in which traditional wisdom is
transmitted. We see here a leaning toward idealism.
Cohen points out $antayana*s contempt for a onilosophy of
striving witnout any worthy end in signt and with no ideals by
wnich to measure progress. We note here Lewisohn 's critieism
of Dewey cited aoove.
r
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5» His Social Philosophy.
Santayana's social philosophy is essentially aristocratic,
but he recognizes that the "emancipated, atneistlc, international
democracy" is replacing the old order with a morality of its
own*
6. His Attitude toward Religion*
Santayana construes religion as a method of emancipating
man from personal limitations and worldliness. He considers
tnat dogmas of religion are helpful to our inner peace by fur-
nishing truth, not about existence, but about ideals. He consid-
ers it superstitious to regard G-od as an existence rather than
as an ideal. He respects Catholic dogma because it calls for
a reasonable deference to authority, but it leaves tne mind es-
sentially free. Cohen expresses tnis opinion.
f* Cohen* s Explanation of the Lack of Recognition of
Santayana.
Cohen attributes the relative absence of explicit recogni-
tion of Santayana, partly to the modern view of pnllosophy as a
narrowed field of speculation and partly to Santayana' s own
poetic style of writing. Cohen considers that "the great trage-
dy of modern philosoj^hy" lies in tne difficulty of formulating
a world-view which does Justice to the discoveries of all the
special sciences, when universal knowledgs is farther than ever
removed from numan possibility. He notes a marked tendency to
1
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llmlt philosophy to th^problen of eplstemology . He citei
Santayana as an example of one who has abandoned scientific
accuracy as uopele3s,ln nis attempt to picture the universe.
Hi8"e33ent ial loneliness" results from his failure to elabor-
ate any solution of the nature of knowledge. Cohen made this
observation in 1919, eight years before tJae appearance of San-
tayana'* Realm of i^ssence^in wnich he developed an episterao-
logical tneory.
Another quality wnich Cohen considers prevents iiantayana
from gaining widespread acceptance is his speculative detach-
ment, which ap.jeals to neither conservatives nor radicals. On
the one hand, he repels religious rationalization by his athe-
istic, non-democratic, and esthetic morality; on Lhe other, he has
escaped the notice of scientific philosophers. ^^ogers,we add,
calls attention to the tone of condescension whicn Santayana
employs in place of argument in his attitude toward conflict-
ing views.
Cohen agrees witn rtogers on a high evaluation of Santayana'
s
literary style, and also in recognition of its lack of appeal
to the popular and to tne pnilosopnic taste. Rogers attributes
such a condition to "academic distrust of literary gifts. "^ Des-
pite^beauLy of diet ion, which Cohen compares to the cadences of
Walter Pater, nis thougnt is difficult to discover in his "pithy
and oracular epigrams." His arguments are not clearly eluci-
dated. ^ We are re linded of Emerson's epigrammatic style.
1 2 3
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Lewlsohn allies Santayana with the great French writerg
of maxims, he attributes the obscurity of his style to tne
"defects of its nieraLic and remote signif icancie. "-^ Lewlsohn'
s
tribute to Santayana is nigh: "Of American prose writers of
his own generation or tne next Laere is none wno is compar-
able to Mr. Santayana, ..• .a suave,muffled, exquisite, but al-
ways alien voice. "^ He seems to olarae tne reader if he fails
to understand Santayana; just as a commentator blamed the audi-
ence for not comprehending i^mersOn's occult sayings.^
Cohen compares Santayana' s cultivation of calm detachment
to Jinerson* We recall Emerson's qmlet withdrawal to his home
in Concord.
A trlDute to Santayana* s comprehensiveness is given when
Conen suggests Santayana' s Life of Reason as the most appro-
priate American work in philosophy to recommend to a European
critic like Taine snould he ask for "a distinct and comprehen-
sive view of numan life, its aims and divers manifestations."^
Such compreiiensiveness reminds us of the German encyclopedist
Hegel.
N. The New Realism.
1. Its Origin.
Cohen treats tne new realism very briefly. He states that
it came about in opposition to certain types of pragmatism
and to the older forms of Idealism. This new system opposes
1 3
Long,AL, 324.
4
Cohen, CH, III, 258.
Lewlsohn, EA, 338-341
.
2
Loc .cit
.
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the Locklan theory that our ideas contain Lhe objects of
knowledge. It does not, t,reat the Hmd as does Scottish
realism, but rather as do Santayana, Dewey, and Aristotle, i.e.,
as a function of the organic bodiy responding to environment,
he includes as pioneers in this field: Woodorldge, Montague,
Holt, and Perry.
2. Frederick J.E.Woodbridge, the Prophet of New Realism.
Cohen gives special consideration to Woodbridge*s contri-
Dution. Woodbridge emphasizes metaphysics and a philosophy
of nature rather than psycnology or eplstemology . His chief
sources are Aristotle, Hobbes, and Spinoza. He opposes the
Lockian tradition of the necessity of examining the mind be-
fore undertaking tne study of nature. He points out that wnen
tne eartn was a fiery mist, there was no consciousness, and
that the epistemological argument presupposes a certain degree
of knowledge. He claims that how we know is irrelevant to
the consideration of specific issues o<ff nature. He looks upon
mind, not as tne Dare subject of knowledge, but as a natural
manifestation of nature, tne relation between things, viz •, the
relation of meaning. Consciousness, for Woodbridge, is the
phenomenon of tnings coming into relation with each other
tnrough tae organic body. Therefore, fornim, logic becomes a
study of tne laws of being rather than of thinking.
Cohen considers that tne new movement received strength
tnrougn Woodorldge *s personal influence, and througn nil
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editorship of The Journal of Pniloaophy , Psycnology, and
Scientific Met nod . His own views are sketcned out not
elaoorated. Riley refers to nim as tne prophet of tne new
movement.^ Tnis opinion is in accord with Conen's.
3« The Six American Neo-Heallst »•
The six American neo-realists Cohen treats together as
tne autnors of The New Realism (1912)# They are Walter Tay-
lor Marvin, Ralph riarton Perry, Edward Gleason Spauldljlg, W.P.
Montague, Edwin Holt, and Walter B.Pitkin» They appeal to the
naive consciousness of reality, but their doctrine is mecnanl
cal and complicated in its reliance upon modern physics, phy-
siology, and experimental biology. The neo-realism has been
called a new scholasticism. Cohen considers tnat the etnlcal
ly neutral symools of matnematics are a great aid in avoiding
tne tendency of pnilosophy to oecome a branch of apologetics.
0. Cohen's General Remarks on the Philosophy of the Period
Covered in This Chapter.
1. The Dominant Interests.
Conen believes that the pnilosopny of the period since
about I8ip0 nas been dominated by two interests: the theologlc
and tne psycnologic. Tne former has weakened; wnereas tne lat
ter nas been strengtnened. He considers that until very re-
cently tne American economic, political, and legal tnought nad
been dominated by eighteenth-century individualism or
1
Riley, AT, 3^1-3^2.
<c
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natural-law philoso-phy,
2. Influence in Education,Law, and History,
Cohen recognizes the influence of W. T.Harris and of
Dewey in the field of education) aad he expects that Roscoe
Pound will exert an influence u^on legal thought with his
pragmatism and the ude of Wari*8 theories. Nevertheless,
Cohen believss that very few noteworthy achievements stand
to the credit of American philosophy. He notes that a leirge
part of American philosophic writing has been in the field
of the history of philosophy,
3. European Forces,
Cohen considers that James and, to a lesser degree, Bald-
win, Royce, ajid Dewey are European forces; and C,S,Peirce's
contribution to logic is recognized in Germany, Italy, and
Great Britain.
ft
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Conclusion
Tnua we see In review tne main trend of American philosophy,
Deginning late in nisLory and not revealing until recent years
any particular originality. It has followed cniefly in the
Scottisn-Britian tradition.
The colonial period was covered with Lne dark shadow of
Calvinism for whicn Edwards* a keen mind served to provide tne
last stron^nold.
In the eighteenth century, Calvmistic logic was dissipated
by the growing Delief in human morality|baaed on a certain free-
dom of the will, and in the benevolence of the Deity.
The early nineteenth century brought Emerson's individual-
ism and tne transcendentaliat emphasis upon that which goes
beyond, or is independent of, sense-experience.
The arid academic period was given a renewed spirit in the
mid-century by the controversy concerning evolution, which
Fiske popularized in this country. The Hegelian type of phil-
osophy was best upheld here by Royce. But pragmat ism, inst 1-
gaLed by the fertile minds of Wright and Pe ire e, continued to
gain strength. James used it as the way to his radical em-
piricism, and Dewey developed its instrumental empnasis. Dewey
leads tne pnilosopnic thougnt of our country today.
Santayana,an alien voice, combines naturalism witn an ap-
preciation of other-worldlinesa. His poetic style and artistic
emphasis are outstanding.
Ji
The new realism opposes the Lockian theory, appeals to the
naive consciousness of reality, and uses a technique which in-
volves mathematical symbols euid modern physics and biology.
The tendency seems to be a'^ay from idealistic systems to-
ward the empirical and the positivistio*
The account of this progress of American philosophic
thought is given very concise and clear treatment by More,
Riley, Goddard, and Cohen in the chapters contributed by them
to the Cambridge History of American Literature * Cohen* s
treatment is particulaxly scholarly and critical*
t
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Summary
Chapter I
Jonatnan Edwarde (1705-17::)8)
Jonathan Edwards, tne great American exponent of Calvln-
Istlc pnilosophy, was essentially a mystic. His native mys-
tlclam found early expression In spontaneous rapture, but it
was all too soon stifled by the conscientious attempt to up-
nold Calvinistic dogma through preaching and through trea-
tises in deductive logic. His monumental logical work
"Tne Freedom of tne Will" concluded that there was no free-
dom of wlll,tnat even in G-od inclination and will were one
function, and that man's inclinations, the strony.eat of which
determined his will at? any time, were given by G-od.
More criticizes Edwards's hatred of evil as disastrous to
his respect for God. It may lead hira to hate God for the
cosmic evils.
Edwards's mysLical strain was revealed late in his career
when he became identified witn the Whltefield Awakening
through his insistence upon tne emotional element in conver^^
sion. This emphasis led in part to Lhe estraagement from
his Northampton congregation.
The usual judgment of Edwards is tnat ne possessed a migh
ty power for deductive reasoning, but that nis conclusions
were rendered invalid by his assumption of false premises;
and that his warm mystical nature was cxillled by the doc-
Lrines of Calvin. More holds tnis opinion.
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Chapter II
Philosopher and Divines (1720-17«9)
The general novements whlcn undermined Calvinism were
tne intellecLual revolL which took t,xie form of deism, tne
emotional revolt wnlch found expression in tne Awakening,
And tne volitional emphasis wnlch was upheiU by the Armini-
ans«
Cnarlea Chauncy, noted for The Benevolence of the Deity ,
argued against the doctrine of determinism and supported
the view of human morality. He considered that the capaci-
ties for happiness in human beings led to a happier view of
tne Creator txhan that entertained by the Galvinists.
Jonathan Mayhew in Tne Divine Goodness argued for the
necessity of wisdom as well as goodness in the nature of
G-od. He also neralded the founding of Unitarianism.
Samuel Johnson early displayed radical views in nis read-
ing of Bacon and In his affiliation with the Church of Eng-
land. He opposed determinism and was attracted to Berkeley
whose disciple he became. He Interpreted metaphysical
Idealism in nis Elementa Philosophica, which was received here
wltn indifference*
John Woolman's Journal revealed mild, my st leal Quakerism
and a love for all mankind. His emphasis was not on contro-
versy but on duty. His treatise "Some Considerations on the
Keeping of Negroes" showed a broad sympathy and a socialistic
eaphasia*
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Chapter III
Transcendentalism
Transcendentalism was tne New England manifestation of
man's practical and imaginative faculties as opposed to
skepticism. Emerson's Nature, The American Scholar , and The
Divinity Scnool Address constitute the chief philosophic
contributions.
The term transcendentalism was derived from Kant's Cri-
tique of Pure Reason , but was generalized and used loosely
to indicate anything which goes beyond experience of sense
or is inaependently given by intuition.
Tne chief raetaphj'-sical ideas held were the existence of
tne Over-Soul which includes all bfting, and the microcosm of
each individual. The movement placed more emphasis upon the
cultivation of an attitude of self-reliance, individualism,
and optimism, than upon the establishment of a metaphysical
sy St em.
Oriental mystical elements were introduced. Emerson and
Thoreau became students of oriental literature. Amoa Alcott
was the chief propagandist.
Transcendentalism was misunderstood because of excesses
and confusion with contemporary movements. G-oddard con-
siders that its strength lay in the fact that it was rooted
in Puritan character.
f
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Chapter IV
The Philoaophy of Emerson (18O3-I882)
Emerson's outstanding position is due not alone to
personal genius but also to his representation of the
"transient experiment" of New England transcendentalism.
His fundamental theory is faith in the Over-fc>oul and in
eacn individual's intuit ion;but he formulated no coherent
system, nor did he often seek to defend his views by argumen-
tation. He expressed his intuitions as he received them
from time to time.
Emerson represented Puritan character influenced by
oriental, G-reek, and seventeenth-century flnglish philosophy.
His ability for expressing great ideas in simple form
is revealed in nis quatrains.
More criticizes Emerson chiefly for his neglect of the
problem of evil. Garlyle agrees. Lewisohn, however, re-
joices in his lack of emphasis upon sin. Parrington, on the
other hand, cites references to evil in Emerson's gournal .
Riley and Firkins show how he triumphed over pain by his
concentration on stronger interests. Emerson is commended
by Kiley for retaining a brilliant optimism through all
nis diverse sufferings.
More calls Smerson the outstanding figure in American
letters. He writes, "Thw world had never before seen any-
thing quite of its kind, and may not see its like again. ""^
i
More, CH, I, 361.
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Chapter V
Later Philosophy
The cnief tradition In American philosophy has been Eng-
lish and Scottish; the 'J-erman influence was not felt, direct-
ly unx.ll 1876. Absorption in material conquest and the
narrow ortnodoxy of church and college combined to serve as
obstacles to the acceptance of G-erman speculation.
Conen names Bowen,Mahan, Bledsoe, and Tappan as "acute"
minds, and Shedd and Hickock as "powerful" minds, during the
arid period of pedantry preceding the evolutionary contro-
versy whicn followed Darwin, Ly ell, and Spencer. The pioneers
in modern American philosophy were John Plske, Chauncey
Wright, and William T.Harris.
Fiske interpreted Spencer's agnosticism and developed a
teleological evolution. His Cosmic Philosophy , written in
vigorous and popular style, was influential in spreading the
evolutionary theory.
Chauncey Wright rejected the Spencerlan philosophy as in-
adequate. He was cut off by an untimely death from develop-
ing Mill's logic. He considered metapnyslcs to iDe a religious
proDlem, and he evaluated religion as an instrumental value
in producing human happiness. Cohen places Wright high in
his adnerence to tne truth. His influence was exerted upon
Pelrce, James, and Dewey.
William T.Harris was influential as the interpreter of
Kant and Hegel to America through Ghe St .Louis School. He
J
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rejected Spencer. He is noted as the organizer of the Con-
cord School of Philosophy, and as the edi-tor from 1867-1893
of the Journal of Speculative Philoso-phy ^ the first philosophi
cal journeil in the English language. Harris was not particu-
larly original, but was important in the fields of education
and jaurnalism.
The academic institutions were very tardy in their recogni
tion of German thought or of any ideas contrary to religious
orthodoxy. At Harvard, Bowen* s cppoaition to Hegelianism was
followed by Palmer's acceptance of this system. At Princeton
McCosh defended Scottish realism as the proper American phil-
osophy. He attempted to harm.cnize religion with evolution,
Ormond,his successor, added Berkeleian and Kantian elements,
^t Yale, Noah Porter, though cognizant of German thought, upheld
Scottish intuitive philosophy. George Trumbull Ladd, a pro-
fessed eclectic, was a follower of Lotzd. His metaphysics was
based upon epistemology in Kantian fashion. Cohen considers
that his -thought was a branch of Christian apologetics. Co-
hen mentions Borden Parker Bovme as "one of the keenest of
American metaphysicians."^
Chacles S.Peirce*8 fertility of thought was outsiianding.
His development of symbolic logic is used by neo-realism. He
formulated the general maxim of pragmatism which was used
later by James. However, James departed from Peirce in his
1
Cohen, CH, III , 240, footnote.
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eaphasis upon the individual rather than ipon the general.
Peirce'a tychlsm was adopted by James.
Josiah Royce' s first Dook, The Relifiioua Aspect of Phil-
osophy , contained xiis meLapny sical loeallsni. He contended
that if the world was knowaDle, there must be an Absolute
Knower,and the world must oe ultimately ideal. The Spirit
of Modern Philosophy , an unusually eloquent book, emphasized
the volitional element, and accepted Berkeleian metaphysics.
He recognized evil but considered that it was conquered by
the Absolute. The World and the Individual reconciled the
individual with zne Absolute by an analogy of the relation
of matnematical infinity to its finite parts. His subse-
quent work was mathematical-logical and ethical-religious.
Royce exerted an influence aistorically upon two forces
wnich have opposed idealism, viz.
,
pragmatism, by his empirical
metnod and by his ethical emphasis, and neo-realism, by hia
contribution to mathematics and logic.
William James's chief contribution waja in the field of
paycxiology. His Principles of Psycnology emphasized the
evolutionary, biologic function of thought, but upneld the
belief in immortality. His pragmatism was only a method
leading to his radical empiricism. Altnough aware of tech-
nique, James did not emphasize a system of thought. He was
definibely empirical. Hia philosophy was a vision of life.
John Dewey la the only American about wnora a scnool of
philosopny nas been centered. Dewey came to instrumental-
lam by the way of English hegellanism. He emphasizes the
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changing situation rather than the Absolute* He i8 a
thoroughgoing naturalist. He eliminates the concepts of
G-od, freedom, and immortality as outworn. He views tne tnink-
ing process as a necessity fOr removing obstacles to physi-
cal adjustment. Dewey has no criterion for inLrinsic valne.
Dewey's influence has been felt strongly in the field of
edue at ion.
James Mark Baldwin's Thoughts and Things , a very obscure
book, was elucidated further by his G-enetic Theory of Reality ,
which developed pancalism wltn its emphasis upon the pri-
macy of the esthetic consciousness.
George Santayana'a view of philosophy is artl«tlc and
synoptic. He coraoines naturalism with an appreciation of
other-worldliness. he distinguishes, in G-reek fashion, be-
tween the brute existence and tne "form" of things. He
scorns tne activity of striving without any worthy end in
view, or any standards by which to measure progress. San-
tayana shows the influence of Latin civilization and Catholi-
cism. Cohen attributes the lack of recognition of Santayana
to his style of writing, the poetry of which is distrusted
by academic philosophers, and the obscurity of which is not
attractive to the ordinary reader.
The new realism aroee in opposition to the Locklan theory
that our ideas contain the objects of knov/ledge. Frederick
J.E.Woodbridge was the prophet of the movement. He emphasized
metaphysics and a philosophy of nature rather tnan epistemolo-
gy« He exerted a great influence through The Jpurnal of
It
(
-09-
Bhilosophy,PsycholOCT',and Scientific Method *
The six American neo-reallsts, Marvin, Perry, Spauldlng,
Montague, Holt, and Pitkin, collaborated in publishing
The New Realism . They appeal to tne naive consclousnegs
of reality, but their doctrine Is technical In Its reliance
upon physics, physiology, and biology, and in its use of neu-
tral mathematical symbols.
Cohen considers that since lb:?0, the theologlc emphasis
has lessened wnl]cthe psychologic has been strengthened.
He names James, Peirce,Royce, Baldwin, and Dewey as European
forces.
4
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